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THE POLITICAL PUZZLE OF THE CIVIL JURY
Jason M. Solomon∗
ABSTRACT
At the root of many contemporary debates over the civil justice or tort
system—debates over punitive damages, preemption, and tort reform more
broadly—are underlying questions about the justification for the civil jury. The
United States is the only country that still uses a jury in civil cases, and most
civil jury trials are tort trials. The jury has more power to decide questions of
law in tort than in any other area of law, so any serious discussion of tort law
must have the civil jury at its center.
The debate over the jury—in both the academic literature and the public
domain—tends to focus on how good or bad it is as an adjudicative institution.
But its justification has often been based on its value as a political institution.
In this Article, I look at the theory, concepts, and empirical evidence
behind four principal justifications for the civil jury as a political institution:
(1) acting as a check on government and corporate power, (2) injecting
community norms into the legal system, (3) providing legitimacy for the civil
justice system, and (4) fostering political and civic engagement among citizens.
I tentatively conclude that the benefits of the civil jury as a political
institution are overstated and provide suggestions for improving the
functioning of the jury as a political institution and for further empirical
research.
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INTRODUCTION
The jury is . . . above all a political institution, and it is from that
point of view that it must always be judged.
—Alexis de Tocqueville

1

In the last four Supreme Court terms, some of the most important cases
involved tort lawsuits, rooted in common law or statute, that resulted in
multimillion-dollar verdicts. On the face of it, each of these cases involved
very different issues—the First Amendment in Snyder v. Phelps,2 preemption
in Wyeth v. Levine,3 punitive damages in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,4 and
the standard for class certification in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.5 But a
common theme ran through each of the cases: suspicion of the civil jury. In
three of the four cases, the side arguing that the civil jury could not be trusted
won the case, losing the fourth by just two votes.
The precise basis for the concern about the civil jury varied in each case. In
Snyder, it was a concern that the jury could use a malleable tort standard of
“outrageousness” to punish disfavored speech.6 In Wyeth, it was that the jury
would unfairly second-guess the Food and Drug Adminstration’s judgment on
what warnings should go on a particular drug.7 In Exxon Shipping, it was that
the civil jury’s damage awards were unpredictable, leading to concerns about

1 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 272 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans.,
Anchor Books 1969) (1835).
2 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216–17 (2011) (holding that the First Amendment protected the free speech of
church members who picketed near the funeral of a military service member).
3 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009) (holding that a state failure-to-warn claim was not preempted by the FDA’s
approval of the warning).
4 554 U.S. 471, 515 (2008) (holding that punitive damages were excessive and could not exceed a 1:1
ratio with compensatory damages).
5 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (holding that class certification was not warranted under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a)’s commonality requirement). This lawsuit did not actually result in a multimillion-dollar
verdict because it never made it to trial, but it was the fear of such a verdict that drove the dynamics around
class certification.
6 131 S. Ct. at 1219 (noting that the outrageousness standard is “highly malleable,” and a jury is likely to
be biased based on “jurors’ tastes or views,” making the jury dangerous in that it could become “an instrument
for the suppression of . . . expression” (alteration in original) (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S.,
Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510 (1984))).
7 555 U.S. at 563–64 (discussing the defendant’s argument that a “lay jury’s decision” should not trump
“the expert judgment of the FDA”); id. at 626 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“By their very nature, juries are ill
equipped to perform the FDA’s cost-benefit-balancing function. . . . [J]uries tend to focus on the risk of a
particular product’s design or warning label that arguably contributed to a particular plaintiff’s injury, not on
the overall benefits of that design or label . . . .”).

SOLOMON GALLEYS4

1334

9/5/2012 9:06 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1331

fairness to and consistency across defendants.8 In Dukes, it was the fear of
massive jury verdicts in class actions that would force corporate defendants
like Wal-Mart to settle, regardless of the merits of the case.9
The public debate and academic literature on the civil jury tend to focus on
how well it performs as an adjudicative institution.10 Can it handle complex
cases? Is it biased against defendants with deep pockets? The task for the
defenders of the jury, then, has been simply to show that the jury does about as
well as (or not much different than) the judge in adjudicating, and in that, they
have largely succeeded.11
But the justification for the civil jury has often been about its benefits as a
political institution. By “political institution,” I mean the jury’s role in our
democracy, other than deciding cases. Leading constitutional law scholar Akhil
Amar, for example, calls the jury the idea “more central” than any other to
“America’s distinctive regime of government of the people, by the people, and
for the people.”12 For Amar, the jury is the institution that best instantiates

8 554 U.S. at 472–73 (“The real problem is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards. Courts are
concerned with fairness as consistency, and the available data suggest that the spread between high and low
individual awards is unacceptable. The spread in state civil trials is great, and the outlier cases subject
defendants to punitive damages that dwarf the corresponding compensatories. The distribution of judgeassessed awards is narrower, but still remarkable.”).
9 See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner at 16, Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277) (“It has long been recognized that loose certification
standards have serious repercussions for American business because they present a risk of gargantuan
verdicts . . . .”).
10 See, e.g., VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 20 (1986); Robert E. Litan,
Introduction to VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 1, 2 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Symposium, Is
the Jury Competent?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 1; Symposium, The Role of the Jury in Civil
Dispute Resolution, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1.
11 Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 379
(2011) (“[W]hen scholars have compared the decision making of juries, judges, and other decision makers, the
overall patterns appear more similar than different.”); Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The Verdict on Juries,
91 JUDICATURE 226, 227 (2008) (“[J]udges agree with jury verdicts in most cases.”); Jennifer K. Robbennolt,
Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 509
(2005) (concluding that research shows “striking similarities in the decisionmaking of judges and jurors”).
12 Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1169
(1995). Amar explores this claim in greatest detail in his book, AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION ch. 5 (1998). Amar is clear both that his claim applies to juries in the civil
and criminal contexts, see Amar, supra, at 1170–71, 1191–92, and that, to the extent the jury today does not
have the central role envisioned by both the Founders and the architects of Reconstruction, that state of affairs
ought be changed, id. at 1191–94.
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popular sovereignty, which he views as essential to our republican form of
government.13
Despite such claims, there has been little focus on how well the civil jury
actually performs the political functions that are ascribed to it. To be sure, a
jury is always acting as both an adjudicative and a political institution, and
these functions cannot be so neatly separated. But the merits and value of the
civil jury in the political sense—in providing legitimacy, incorporating
community norms, and improving democratic citizenship—are often taken for
granted, without an adequate theoretical and empirical basis. The task of this
Article is to begin to address this gap in the literature.
In discussing these issues, I return frequently to the particular issue that led
me here: the role of the contemporary civil jury in tort cases, the very issue that
has occupied the Supreme Court.14 An estimated 90% of civil jury trials every
year take place in state courts,15 and in many state courts, the civil jury is
“overwhelmingly a tort institution.”16 Despite the consensus that judges decide
issues of law and juries decide issues of fact,17 in tort cases, the civil jury’s
power is unusually high.18 Here, the jury is deciding law-like questions about
13 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty,
Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749–50 (1994).
14 I use the term “tort” here to refer broadly to civil claims not arising out of contract or property rights
where one party claims that another has wronged him. This includes traditional common law torts, statutory
torts like employment discrimination or consumer fraud, and constitutional torts against government officials
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (2000) (defining a tort as “conduct
that amounts to a legal wrong and that causes harm for which courts will impose civil liability”).
15 Marc Galanter, The Regulatory Function of the Civil Jury, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY
SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 61, 69. In 2009, there were 2138 civil jury trials in federal district court. STATISTICS
DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 16 (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf. 2005 is the most recent year for which state-court data is
readily available. In that year, there were 18,404 jury trials in state court. LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H.
COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 223851, CIVIL BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 3
(2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf. Although from different years, these
numbers would seem to indicate that Galanter’s figure of 90% has not changed significantly.
16 Galanter, supra note 15, at 66; see also Robert C. LaFountain & Neal B. Kauder, An Empirical
Overview of Civil Trial Litigation, CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS, (Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Williamsburg, Va.)
Feb. 2005, available at http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/civil&CISOPTR=
24&filename=25.pdf (listing more recent data supporting Galanter’s assertion).
17 See, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 106 (1895); United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042,
1043 (D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545) (“It is the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the law; and it is the
duty of the jury to follow the law, as it is laid down by the court.”).
18 See Mark P. Gergen, The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common Law, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 424 (1999) (“Negligence law is the logical place to start in mapping the role of the jury
in deciding normative issues in the common law for it is here that the jury has the most say.”).
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what is right and wrong conduct, questions with a significant normative or
evaluative component and not factual questions about whether the traffic light
was red or green.19
The United States is currently the only country that uses a jury in a large
number of civil cases,20 and the extensive use of the civil jury to decide
normative issues has costs. One significant cost is to formal rule-of-law values
and principles, such as “treat like cases alike,” that arise from features of the
civil jury—the lack of reasons given for decisions and the fact that their
decisions have no precedential value—that are unlikely to change.21
Mark Gergen has referred to the allocation of power between judge and
jury as being determined by “weighing competing values on a scale.”22 As he
puts it:
On one side of this scale are the values of popular judgment. On the
other side are the values of satisfying what Lon Fuller described as
the demands of the “inner morality of law”—[“]make the law known,
make it coherent and clear, see that your decisions as an official are
23
guided by it, etc.”

This paper considers the benefits of using a jury to incorporate the values of
popular judgment in light of the harm to rule-of-law values that I describe and
explore further in a companion paper.24 My tentative conclusion here is that the
benefits are overstated. In the companion paper, I challenge the conventional
wisdom that juries and open-ended standards are really better suited than
judges and presumptive rules in identifying and applying social norms. I argue
that judges can use heuristics like custom, regulations, and market information
to identify social norms and use them to determine reasonableness in
negligence. Greater judicial control of the reasonableness inquiry is both

19 See id. at 424–25 (explaining that juries retain “a great deal of normative discretion in deciding what is
reasonably prudent conduct” in negligence cases).
20 See Graham C. Lilly, The Decline of the American Jury, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 53, 59 (2001) (“America
is now the only country in the world where the jury continues to play both a broad and a central role in the
adjudicatory process.”).
21 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51
IND. L.J. 467, 468 (1976) (“We are rapidly approaching the day when liability will be determined routinely on
a case by case . . . basis, with decision makers (often juries) guided only by the broadest of general principles.
When that day arrives, the retreat from the rule of law will be complete . . . .”).
22 Gergen, supra note 18, at 438.
23 Id. (quoting LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 42 (rev. ed. 1969)).
24 See Jason M. Solomon, Juries, Social Norms, and the Legitimacy of Civil Justice (July 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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plausible and desirable, I argue, in part for more accurate determinations of
wrongfulness and in part to minimize the number of inconsistent jury verdicts.
One threshold question, though, might be the following: Why talk about
civil juries at all? Why not just talk about the political function of juries, full
stop? Sometimes juries hear criminal cases, sometimes civil. But their basic
role in our democracy, the argument goes, remains the same.
This is not quite true, though. The clearest example of this is the jury’s role
in criminal cases in checking the government’s role as prosecutor. Though
there may be ways in which the civil jury acts to check government power,25
the justification must rest on a very different basis. On the other hand, in the
criminal context, much has been written about the role of the jury in
incorporating community norms into the law.26 Though the application is likely
to be somewhat different, this literature may well be useful in the civil context
as well.
Relative to the significant literature on the role of criminal juries in
democracy, though, the issues around the political or democratic value of the
civil jury are less explored.27 As George Priest put it, “[A]lthough the role of
the criminal jury in protecting citizens from the arbitrary exercise of
governmental power has received extensive study, the political role of the civil
jury has been largely neglected.”28
25

See infra Part I.A.
See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Change of Venue and the Role of the Criminal Jury, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1533, 1551–53 (1993) (articulating the ways that jurors use “community standards” in deciding criminal
cases); Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 904 (1999) (arguing that the
jury has “room to bring their sense of community norms into the process of applying the law to the facts”);
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 473 (1997) (arguing that
community norms arise from a complex process that includes the enforcement and prosecution of crimes).
27 There is, of course, an extensive literature on the role of juries, but most of it either focuses explicitly
on criminal juries or simply conflates the function of or justification for the criminal and civil jury. As
Lawrence Friedman has put it, “[T]he criminal jury gets the lion’s share of the attention and the civil jury sits
home among the ashes.” Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Notes on the Civil Jury in Historical Perspective, 48
DEPAUL L. REV. 201, 201 (1998).
28 George L. Priest, The Role of the Civil Jury in a System of Private Litigation, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
161, 162 (footnote omitted); see also Victoria A. Farrar-Myers & Jason B. Myers, Echoes of the Founding:
The Jury in Civil Cases as Conferrer of Legitimacy, 54 SMU L. REV. 1857, 1860 (2001) (noting that
contemporary debates about the power of the civil jury ignore “the system’s seemingly forgotten political
role”).
Though there have been important additions, the basic thrust of the literature has not changed much
since Priest’s remarks twenty years ago. The notable exceptions include JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND
DEMOCRACY (2010); Developments in the Law—The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1421–42 (1997);
and John T. Nockleby, What’s a Jury Good For?, VOIR DIRE, Summer 2005, at 6, 6.
26
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There has certainly been important work exploring the theoretical aspects
of the civil jury as a political institution. Some of this work has considered
political justifications for the civil jury broadly,29 while others have looked at
specific justifications like providing legitimacy,30 injecting community
norms,31 or instantiating deliberative democracy.32
Until recently, there has not been much empirical evidence on how well the
civil jury functions as a political institution. For many years, George Priest’s
research on Cook County, Illinois juries was a primary exception to the lack of
this kind of empirical work.33 And in the last few years, a major empirical
effort, The Jury and Democracy Project, has made a substantial contribution in
remedying this neglect, but more work remains.34
Evaluating the civil jury as a political institution depends in part upon how
one sees the place of the jury in our overall governmental and political
structure. To the extent the literature on the jury addresses this issue, it is with
29

See generally RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM (2003) (elaborating upon the
role and function of both the criminal and the civil jury); see, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The Civil Jury and
American Democracy, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 79, 80–87 (2003) (explicating the political function of the
civil jury in a historical and comparative perspective); Stephan Landsman, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries,
70 U. CIN. L. REV. 873, 880–83 (2002) [hereinafter Landsman, Appellate Courts] (arguing that the civil jury
“contributes to American democracy” in many different ways); Stephan Landsman, So What? Possible
Implications of the Vanishing Trial Phenomenon, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 973, 974–76 (2004)
(explaining the political benefits of the civil jury); Doug Rendleman, Chapters of the Civil Jury, 65 KY. L.J.
769 (1977) (exploring society’s ambivalence toward delegating authority to the jury through three case
studies).
30 See, e.g., Farrar-Myers & Myers, supra note 28, at 1882–83 (calling for increased recognition of the
jury’s role in providing legitimacy and participation in government for ordinary citizens); Martin A. Kotler,
Social Norms and Judicial Rulemaking: Commitment to Political Process and the Basis of Tort Law, 49 U.
KAN. L. REV. 65, 90–94 (2000) (discussing the democratic legitimacy of the jury’s lawmaking power).
31 See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans, Juries as Conduits for Culture?, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL
PRACTICE 80 (David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009) (exploring the ways in which juries can inject
cultural norms and how these mechanisms have changed over time); Joseph Sanders, A Norms Approach to
Jury “Nullification:” Interests, Values, and Scripts, 30 LAW & POL’Y 12 (2008).
32 See Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 345–50 (2003)
(discussing the jury as a “[m]odel [d]eliberative [d]emocratic [b]ody” but noting that “few authors have
discussed . . . the extent to which existing legal juries embody deliberative ideals”); see also JEFFREY
ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY (1994) (arguing for the
superiority of deliberative democracy over representative democracy in the jury, though focusing on the
criminal context); Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 125, 132–34
(arguing for the importance of diversity on juries, while retaining the “impartiality” ideal for overall jury
deliberations).
33 See Priest, supra note 28 (studying the work of Cook County, Illinois civil juries from 1959 to 1979
and finding that the issues addressed by juries rarely implicate the political justifications for the institution).
34 See GASTIL ET AL., supra note 28; JURY & DEMOCRACY PROJECT, http://www.la1.psu.edu/cas/jurydem/
index.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2012). For a discussion of the project’s findings, see infra Part IV.B.
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two very different conceptions of democratic governance in mind. These two
conceptions—pluralist or representative democracy, and deliberative
democracy—happen to be the two leading contenders in contemporary
democratic theory.35 Though the jury is used as a model or jumping-off point
for many other ideas in democratic theory, the place of the jury itself in
democratic theory and practice has received relatively little scrutiny.36
The Article will proceed as follows: Part I will explore the idea that the
civil jury is justified as a check on government, private power, and the repeat
players in the legal system. Part II looks closely at the justification that the
civil jury provides democratic legitimacy by exploring the representative and
deliberative conceptions of democracy on which the legitimacy justifiation is
based and how well they fit the reality of the contemporary civil jury.
Part III turns to the idea that the civil jury injects community norms into the
legal system, considering the theoretical, conceptual, and empirical
underpinnings of this claim. In Part IV, I turn to the claim that service on a
civil jury produces better democratic citizens.37 Though this effect has long
been assumed, the evidence is mixed. Indeed, attempting to meet the
representative-democracy ideal in the civil jury may well impede this function.
I conclude in Part V by briefly considering the implications of some of these
tentative conclusions for how to improve the civil jury as a political institution.

35 See Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative Law, 97 IOWA L.
REV. 849, 885–87 (2012) (explicating some of the differences between “majoritarian or pluralistic” theories of
democracy and deliberative democracy).
36 For notable exceptions, see ABRAMSON, supra note 32, at 8; DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC
AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK ch. 8 (2008); GASTIL ET AL., supra note 28, at 12–15, 17–25,
191–92; Lisa Kern Griffin, “The Image We See Is Our Own”: Defending the Jury’s Territory at the Heart of
the Democratic Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 332, 334–36 (1996) (reviewing ABRAMSON, supra note 32, and
STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM (1994)); Phoebe A. Haddon,
Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 29 (1994); David F. Partlett, The Republican Model and
Punitive Damages, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1409, 1421–24 (2004); Richard A. Primus, When Democracy Is Not
Self-Government: Toward a Defense of the Unanimity Rule for Criminal Juries, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1417,
1420–22 (1997).
37 In a paper called What’s a Jury Good for?, civil justice scholar John Nockleby presents three such
functions for the jury, all tied to its role as a political institution. Nockleby, supra note 28. Nockleby describes
these functions as (1) to incorporate a “deliberative democratic body within the third branch of government,”
(2) to check and balance the exercise of governmental and corporate power and to instill social norms within
the judicial process, and (3) to legitimate “both the process and the outcome of legal judgments.” Id. at 6
(emphasis omitted).
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My approach in this paper is akin to what Ed Rubin calls microanalysis of
institutions38 and can be seen as an effort at “new legal realism.”39 That is, this
paper examines the justifications for the civil jury—historical and
contemporary ones in the academic literature as well as in popular discourse—
and subjects them to conceptual and empirical scrutiny.40 This kind of overall
analysis—marrying the theoretical, conceptual, and empirical—is largely
missing from the existing literature, and it is a large and ongoing task. This
paper is just one small step. In many ways, this paper simply tries to lay out
some relevant questions and the data on our existing answers, and then hopes
that others will join in exploring these issues.
Always, the inquiry must be relative: To what extent does the jury perform
well—not just generally but also better than judges—on its ascribed political
functions? After all, as Richard Posner has put it, “The direct cost of jury trials
plainly exceeds that of bench trials. Only if a great deal of value is assigned to
John Stuart Mill’s ‘education in citizenship’ rationale, or to some other
political value of jury trial, are the added costs likely to be offset by greater
benefits . . . .”41
I. CHECKING GOVERNMENTAL AND CORPORATE POWER
A. Government Power
Historically, the civil jury in the United States, like the criminal jury, was
justified in large part as a check against the abuse of government power.42
American colonists regularly rejected enforcement of British revenue and other

38 Edward L. Rubin, Commentary, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1425 (1996) (describing this approach as being one
which focuses on “aspects of social institutions that operate at the particularized level,” making normative premises
more likely to converge and generating common understanding and communication, if not complete substantive
agreement).
39 See Howard Erlanger et al., Foreword, Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335,
337 (“[N]ew legal realist scholars bring together legal theory and empirical research to build a stronger
foundation for understanding law and formulating legal policy.”). For a broader discussion of the new legal
realism, see generally Symposium, New Legal Realism Symposium: Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005
WIS. L. REV. 335.
40 This paper relies on existing empirical research and, in some areas, points toward the need for
additional research.
41 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1502
(1999).
42 Although this brief discussion of the history begins with the Founding of the United States, the
institution of the jury goes back at least to the ancient Greeks.
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laws and actions by British creditors to collect debts in civil jury trials.43 At the
time, judges were appointed by the king,44 and Anti-Federalists also voiced the
need, in the words of Elbridge Gerry of the Philadelphia Convention, “to guard
agst. corrupt Judges.”45 Citizens could not trust judges to act independently and
decide cases without bias toward the British government.46
After serving as a check on the power of the British crown, the civil jury
was recognized as a necessary safeguard for individuals against the
government and an important democratic instrument.47 When a provision
guaranteeing a right to a civil jury trial was left out of the original Constitution,
Anti-Federalists vehemently protested the omission in their opposition to
ratification.48 Patrick Henry referred to the jury trial (both civil and criminal) in
speeches to the Virginia ratification convention as one of the rights “dear to
human nature” and the “best appendage of freedom.”49
Besides the concern about judicial bias, a second reason for the civil jury
was its role in protecting citizens from oppressive laws.50 In Virginia, for
example, both James Monroe and Patrick Henry expressed concerns that
Congress could enact oppressive tax laws that would be enforced without a
jury right.51 Without making it explicit, this kind of Anti-Federalist defense of
the civil jury was predicated on the jury’s ability to find for certain defendants
while disregarding the law when justice seemed to require.52 Even though the
43

Ellen E. Sward, Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV. 389, 459–60 & n.382 (2004).
Joseph H. Smith, An Independent Judiciary: The Colonial Background, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1104,
1104–05 (1976).
45 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 587 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
46 See Smith, supra note 44, at 1147 (citing 3 JOHN ADAMS, Independence of the Judiciary, in THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 513, 514–15 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1856)).
47 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1183 (1991) (“Spanning
both civil and criminal proceedings, the key role of the jury was to protect ordinary individuals against
governmental overreaching.”); Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 600 (1993) (“It was critical to the Anti-Federalists that the jury serve the
interests of democracy by injecting the values of the ‘many’ into judicial proceedings.”); Sward, supra note 43,
at 461 (“It appears, then, that the most important justification for the civil jury at the country’s founding was
the protection it offered to individuals against the government.”).
48 See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV.
639, 670–71 n.85 (1973).
49 Patrick Henry, Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, reprinted in 3 THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 314, 324 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1891).
50 See Wolfram, supra note 48, at 705–08 (describing the civil jury’s ability to be a defense against
oppressive laws).
51 Henry, supra note 49, at 218, 577–78.
52 Wolfram, supra note 48, at 704–05.
44
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Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury was enacted in the Bill of Rights by a
Federalist Congress, the Amendment was a reflection of the arguments and
efforts of the Anti-Federalists.53 At the time of the founding, preserving local
self-rule was very much on the minds of the Anti-Federalists in arguing for a
right to a civil jury.54
None of these justifications for the jury as a check on government power
appear to exist today. Eighty percent of state trial judges today are elected,55
whereas at the time the Constitution was ratified and until the mid-nineteenth
century, state trial judges were mostly appointed.56 Judges are also much more
professional and less prone to corruption today,57 though the influence of
campaign contributions remains a significant concern.58 And it remains the
case that judges are not beholden to the ruling authority in the same way that
they were at the time of the Founding.
If we do still need civil juries as checks on judges, it is not clear how
exactly this check quite works. Perhaps the idea is that judges might be less
inclined to grant directed verdicts for defendants if the jurors are sitting in the
courtroom and, having listened to a trial, are eager to decide it.59 Or perhaps if
53

Landsman, supra note 47, at 599–600; Wolfram, supra note 48, at 673.
See Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the
Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern Localism, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 74, 91 (1990) (“In arguing for the right to
civil jury trial, [the Anti-Federalists] said that legal rights should be settled by the jury of the vicinage—a jury
which would base its decision on the local knowledge of ordinary people (including information about the
parties) rather than on some uniform, homogenous version of the law.”).
55 See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1105 (2007)
(finding, based on national data compiled by the National Center for State Courts in 2004, that 41% of state
trial judges are elected in nonpartisan elections and 38% are elected in partisan elections); see also LARRY C.
BERKSON ET AL., AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A SPECIAL REPORT
(2010), available at http://judicialselection.com/uploads/documents/Berkson_1196091951709.pdf.
56 See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial
Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1080 (2010) (tracing the “wave of judicial elections” that swept the country
from 1846 to 1851).
57 See Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 377, 450 (1996) (describing early judges as having “little legal knowledge” and noting that the
competency of legal professionals has “increased over time”); Wolfram, supra note 48, at 681 (discussing
corruption of judges as part of the history of the Seventh Amendment). But see Donald C. Nugent, Judicial
Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 34–49 (1994) (providing an overview of the types of bias in the judiciary).
58 Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of
Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 73 (2011) (presenting evidence that
judges are influenced by campaign contributions).
59 For example, federal judges give directed verdicts in only .1% of cases. Gillian K. Hadfield, Where
Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing
Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 732 (2004). For an idea of how
frequently such verdicts are given in state courts, see THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF
54
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judges make rulings at trial that favor a particular side that they agree with
ideologically—such as plaintiffs and the trial lawyers, or businesses and the
defense bar—then the jury can counteract that bias by tilting the other way on
liability, damages, or both.60
As to the government being a party, the government is only a party in about
7% of cases.61 Contrast this to India, for example, where the government is a
party in 60% of civil cases.62 To be sure, one important part of the civil justice
system is the constitutional torts brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate
individual constitutional rights.63 Government officials are defendants in these
cases, and Akhil Amar has argued that the Fourth Amendment’s ban on
unreasonable searches and seizures went hand in hand with the Seventh
Amendment to provide citizens the power to determine what was reasonable.64
So we might think, as Amar does, that this is a good area to have a civil jury to
check government power.65
It is not clear, though, that a jury of lay people would be more inclined to
check government power and uphold rights than a judge in this instance. For
example, many of these cases are brought by prisoners or others who have

JUSTICE, NCJ 202803, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001, at 3 (2004), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ctcvlc01.pdf.
60 See David C. Vladeck, Defending Courts: A Brief Rejoinder to Professors Fried and Rosenberg, 31
SETON HALL L. REV. 631, 641 (2001) (“The interaction between judge and jury is . . . a powerful check on any
excess or abuse.”).
61 In 2007, the federal government was a party in 45,464 civil filings, making it a party in 17.7% of the
257,507 U.S. district court cases that year. STATISTICS DIV., supra note 15, at 12 tbl.4. However, federal civil
claims are far fewer than state civil claims, of which there were approximately 18 million in 2007, the most
recent year for which data is available. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2007 STATE COURT CASELOADS 1 (2009), available at http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.
org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/civil&CISOPTR=64&filename=65.pdf. Evidence shows that state
governments are a party in about 7% of state tort cases and about 5% of state contract cases. John A. Goerdt et
al., Litigation Dimensions: Torts and Contracts in Large Urban Courts, 19 ST. CT. J., 1995, at 1, 13, 18.
Because of the vast difference in number between state and federal claims, 7% is a rough approximation for
total claims in which the government, state or federal, is a party.
62 Marc Galanter, The Myth of Litigious India, 1 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 65, 73 (2009) (citing Letter
from Richard Messick, Legal & Policy Analyst for the Pub. Sector Grp., World Bank, to author (Jan. 14,
2002)).
63 See generally SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS (3d ed. 2009) (surveying and
analyzing general principles that form the basis for § 1983 claims involving constitutional torts).
64 See AMAR, supra note 12, at 67–75 (explicating this connection).
65 See Amar, supra note 12, at 1191–92.
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been detained by the police, and juries are notoriously sympathetic to law
enforcement and disinclined to be supportive of individual rights.66
Finally, it seems difficult to understand the theory under which the civil
jury would be a check on a legislature in the context of tort law. One can
imagine the theory going one of a few ways: First, if it was the case that a
particular state legislature was passing laws creating new rights of action—
consumer fraud, for example—then one could say that the civil jury might act
to limit the scope of such rights of action if too many claims were being
brought.67 From a different direction, if a state legislature were passing laws,
whether procedural or substantive, under the banner of tort reform to make it
more difficult for plaintiffs to bring tort claims,68 then the civil jury might act
as a check by making it easier for plaintiffs to bring claims, thereby
undermining the will of the legislature.
Neither of these theories seem particularly likely. As to the first, with the
possible exception of consumer fraud, state legislatures do not appear to be
creating causes of action willy-nilly.69 Even if they were, a jury that does not
even hear claims until they get past dispositive motions would not be in the
best position to be a gatekeeper.

66

See Stephen P. Garvey et al., Juror First Votes in Criminal Trials, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 371,
381, 396 (2004) (“Most of the jurors believed the police testimony they heard.”). For an account of pro-police
bias and the jury’s focus on the “subjective good faith of the police officer,” see Project, Suing the Police in
Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 800–06 (1979).
67 See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts,
54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 15 (2005) (discussing the expansion of consumer protection acts by state legislatures).
68 See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV.
437, 470–79 (2006); David A. Hyman et al., Estimating the Effect of Damages Caps in Medical Malpractice
Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 355, 358 (2009) (detailing further the effects of the Texas
tort reform legislation); Charles Silver et al., The Impact of the 2003 Texas Medical Malpractice Damages Cap
on Physician Supply and Insurer Payouts: Separating Facts from Rhetoric, 44 ADVOCATE 25, 25 (2008)
(describing the effects of Texas tort reform legislation as making it more difficult for plaintiffs to successfully
bring claims); see also Allen Redlich, Ending the Never-Ending Medical Malpractice Crisis, 38 ME. L. REV.
283, 316–24 (1986) (describing the adoption of state legislation by forty-nine states from 1974–1976 designed
to curb the increased cost of malpractice insurance).
69 Rather, their efforts have been aimed largely at restricting the ability of plaintiffs to bring suit. Carl T.
Bogus, Introduction: Genuine Tort Reform, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (observing that, since
2005, a majority of states have enacted medical malpractice tort reform and tort reform measures regarding
joint and several liability and the collateral source rule); Hubbard, supra note 68, at 524 (“[I]t seems plausible
that the various pro-defendant changes have had at least some pro-defendant impact in terms of plaintiffs’
recoveries . . . .”); see also id. at 483–524 (offering an overview of tort reform measures that have taken place
within state legislatures).
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As to the second theory, most evidence shows that citizens are fairly
sympathetic to the aims of many tort reforms, with public opinion being in
favor of the idea that plaintiffs get too much or are generally unworthy and
overly litigious.70 Moreover, many of the tort reforms are about things like
joint and several liability, damage caps, or requirements to get certain kinds of
experts in medical malpractice cases, which all tend to be matters of law for
the judge and not things that juries can really have any control over.71
Without the government as a frequent litigant72 or judges being controlled
by a central governmental authority, it is hard to see how checking government
power could serve as a contemporary, functional justification for the civil
jury.73 Ultimately, an argument that combines the distrust of government and
judges with the need to “temper” the law is an argument for nullification.
Nullification, though, is not necessary or desirable in the civil context.
Unlike in criminal law, there is enough flexibility already built into the
standards. In tort law, when a jury assesses whether a defendant’s conduct is
reasonable, its members are able to consider whatever factors they choose. It
seems unlikely that they would find the defendant’s conduct unreasonable and
then feel the need to nullify. They would simply say that the defendant
behaved reasonably. Or if they thought that the defendant behaved
unreasonably but should not be held liable for the harm, then they could simply
find no causation, or no proximate cause. And of course, generally, they need
not provide reasons at all but may simply say liable or not liable.
B. Corporate Power
Perhaps, then, the civil jury can be justified as a check against private
power. After all, the Anti-Federalists’ insistence on the Seventh Amendment
was driven in significant part by a desire to protect debtors from the creditors
70 Edith Greene et al., Jurors’ Attitudes About Civil Litigation and the Size of Damage Awards, 40 AM.
U. L. REV. 805 (1991); Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Perceptions of Civil Justice: The Litigation
Crisis Attitudes of Civil Jurors, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 181 (1994).
71 For a discussion of tort reform and medical malpractice, see supra note 68.
72 Kaimipono David Wenger & David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1115, 1150
(“The protective function is less present in civil nullification because most cases are not brought with the aid
of government officials.”).
73 See Ballard v. Uribe, 715 P.2d 624, 647–48 (Cal. 1986) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (“While
jury nullification may be debatable in the criminal trial context, it certainly has no place in a civil trial where
neither party has a right to a general verdict and where there is no double jeopardy bar.”). But see Landsman,
Appellate Courts, supra note 29, at 880 (arguing that the “civil jury is the democratic check on the judiciary,”
which is otherwise shielded from the popular will).
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in the big cities.74 According to this view, the pharmaceutical companies or
auto manufacturers of the early twenty-first century are the big-city creditors of
the late eighteenth.
The theory of the jury as a check on corporate power takes two main forms:
structural and substantive. The structural account focuses on the institutional
features of the civil jury that make it unlikely to be unduly influenced by
corporate interests. Unlike administrative agencies, where the decision makers
may be hopeful of more lucrative jobs down the road,75 or elected officials,
who rely on corporate interests to fund their campaigns,76 the lay people on the
civil jury have no particular reason to curry favor.
Seen more broadly in the context of our democratic institutions, the civil
jury serves as a backstop to regulatory agencies, like the FDA, that may be
hampered by limited resources or industry capture.77 This kind of substantive
justification for the jury as a check on corporate power—that the jury would
bring different values and produce different outcomes—is closely related to the
structural account emphasizing popular sovereignty.
Carl Bogus, whose book, Why Lawsuits Are Good for America, emphasizes
the role of the jury in checking corporate power, puts it this way:
[N]ot only does the products liability system bring into public view
decisions balancing the utility and the hazards of the products we use
and depend on, but it allows the people to pass judgment on those
decisions. . . .
74 See William E. Nelson, Summary Judgment and the Progressive Constitution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1653,
1658 (2008) (noting that “back-country Antifederalists” wanted the civil jury as an “instrument for preventing
oppression by metropolitan creditors and other metropolitan interests”); Wolfram, supra note 48, at 673–703
(relating the Seventh Amendment to concerns about the protection of debtors).
Resistance to a Constitution without a civil jury right was especially potent from Southern states with
large numbers of debtors who feared lawsuits from creditors in federal court without a jury. See JOHN H.
LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 492–93 (2009); Henry, supra note 49, at 170, 289–90 (providing speeches from Anti-Federalists
that connect the relief for debtors with the right to a civil jury).
75 Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of Judicial Review,
70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 267–86 (2009) (arguing that job opportunities function as incentives that can influence
agency decision makers).
76 Campaign finance is likely to be increasingly dominated by corporate funding. See, e.g., Tom Udall,
Amend the Constitution to Restore Public Trust in the Political System: A Practitioner’s Perspective on
Campaign Finance Reform, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 242 (2010) (describing Citizens United v. FEC,
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), and how the combination of “independent expenditures” and limits on direct campaign
contributions have affected campaign finance in California).
77 THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 198 (2001) (“The tort system
is the last defense when government standards are weak, outdated, or set by the regulated industry.”).
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. . . . We know, as well, that regulatory agencies cannot do the
job alone. . . . [I]t is appropriate that people participate in these
78
judgments.

The question, though, is whether the civil jury is the best way for “the
people” to participate in these judgments. One-shot juries are ill-equipped to
assess the costs and benefits of one design choice versus another, for
example.79 And the way that the people do and ought to participate in productdesign decisions is through either the market (as Bogus acknowledges),80 the
regulatory agencies (that may be responsive to consumer groups or public
opinion),81 or the legislators (who can lobby agencies or pass laws on behalf of
concerned constituents).82 One can imagine a way to better incorporate citizen
participation into agency deliberations, for example.83 But that seems a more
fitting home for citizen input into product safety.
We must also distinguish here between the very existence of common law
actions and the civil jury as the decision maker in such actions. Defenders of
tort law, like Bogus, Koenig, and Rustad, primarily defend the existence of the
right to recourse against corporations, not the identity of the decision maker,
the civil jury.84 Koenig and Rustad’s book In Defense of Tort Law, for
example, mentions the jury hardly at all.85
Because of the existence of a reasonably robust system of tort law, the
argument goes, individuals who are harmed in particular ways can bring a
78

CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS,
219–20 (2001); accord KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 77, at 187 (arguing that one of
the advantages of tort law over regulation is that the public sets a high standard of care for product safety and
development).
79 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 626 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that juries are “ill
equipped” to perform cost–benefit analysis); James Wootton, Comment, in REGULATION THROUGH
LITIGATION 304, 306–07 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) (describing mock-juror data that shows how the lack of
jury expertise leads to poor regulation, saying that “[a]gency evaluation is conducted by people with a high
level of expertise in the relevant field” and that “[j]udges usually have little expertise in the area of scrutiny,
and juries have even less expertise”).
80 BOGUS, supra note 78, at 219–20.
81 JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 72–89
(1989).
82 Barry R. Weingast, Regulation, Reregulation, and Deregulation: The Political Foundations of Agency
Clientele Relationships, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1981, at 147, 149–51.
83 See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, Why Not Administrative Grand Juries?, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 465, 512–14
(1992).
84 Koenig and Rustad see tort law as a form of “social control,” which protects a myriad of individual
rights, such as dignity, bodily integrity, and enjoyment of property. KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 77, at 206.
85 The book contains only a brief discussion of the jury, which focuses primarily on jury verdicts and tort
reform. Id. at 74–76.
AND THE COMMON LAW
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common law action, like a products liability suit, to hold accountable those
who have wronged them.86 We might think, as I do, that this is good for social
equality,87 or we might think that it is good to provide an additional incentive
for companies that make mass-market products to take due care in designing
their products. We might call this more efficient deterrence of risky activity, or
we might see it as greater social justice.88 Either way, it is the existence of the
common law—and the ability of individuals themselves to bring actions—that
acts as a check on corporate power, not necessarily the civil jury as the
decision maker in such actions.
The substantive account of juries as checks on corporate power is simply
that juries are likely to be more willing to hold corporations accountable than
judges.89 There is certainly evidence that juries hold corporate defendants to a
higher standard than they do individual defendants.90 But are they more likely
to be tough on corporations than judges? The evidence says no.91
To be sure, juries do award higher damage awards than judges.92 But juries
are, if anything, less pro-plaintiff than judges.93 Juries frequently judge
86

Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1765, 1790–91

(2009).
87 For a related discussion of social equality, see Jason M. Solomon, Civil Recourse as Social Equality,
39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 243, 252–63 (2011).
88 For a discussion of the relationship of social justice to tort law, see KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 77,
at 9, 175–204; and Anita Bernstein, Complaints, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 37, 51–53 (2000).
89 See Kimberly A. Moore, Populism and Patents, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 76 (2007) (discussing how
juries are more likely to be biased against corporations than are judges in patent law suits); Ann M. Scarlett,
Shareholders in the Jury Box: A Populist Check Against Corporate Mismanagement, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 127,
158, 172–73 (2009) (discussing judges’ deference in business cases and jurors’ potential biases against
corporate defendants, saying that “juries tend to award larger damages against corporate defendants than
individual defendants”). But see Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors’ Treatment of
Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 352–53 (1998) (arguing that, although juries do, in certain
instances, treat corporations differently, many of the popular conceptions about juror bias are statistically
unfounded).
90 See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
91 See VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 38–39
(2000); Hans, supra 89, at 341.
92 Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform, 33 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 2 (2004) (noting that jury trials are associated with higher levels of compensatory and punitive
damages, even after taking into account variables pertaining to the parties involved, case type, and the county
location); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1065 (1964) (finding that, on
average, juries’ damage awards were 20% higher than judges reported they would have awarded).
93 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1157–58 (1992) (finding that plaintiffs won at trial more often before judges in federal
cases); Hans & Vidmar, supra note 11, at 227 (“The notion of the pro-plaintiff jury is contradicted by many
studies that show both actual and mock jurors subject plaintiffs’ evidence to strict scrutiny.”); Neil Vidmar,
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plaintiffs harshly, as, for example, in years of tobacco lawsuits when juries
frequently found for the tobacco companies, sometimes on the ground that the
plaintiff assumed the risk.94 And although research has shown minor
differences in the outcomes that judges and juries reach on the same evidence,
juries do not find in favor of individual defendants any more than they do for
business defendants, both generally and relative to judges.95
C. Repeat Players
One justification for the jury that might combine its possible role as a check
on governmental and private power is advanced by Marc Galanter, who
defends the jury’s role not so much at trial as in the pretrial “litigotiation”
process that frequently leads to settlement.96 Were it not for the jury, Galanter
argues, the process would be dominated by the values of the repeat players of
judges and lawyers.97
Considering the “point of view of regulating the litigotiation process,”
Galanter points to the advantage of the jury as being “a fresh response less
mediated by institutional concerns and more resonant with the emerging moral
sense of community.”98 It is not clear how the injection of these values affects
outcomes, though one might speculate that a jury’s willingness to award higher
damage awards might increase settlement amounts. Earlier in the piece,
though, he indicates that juries decide cases pretty much along the same lines
as judges and are not significantly more generous than judges in damage
awards.99

The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 870 (1998).
The findings of Clermont and Eisenberg, though, need to be qualified because we don’t know what role
selection bias may have played in this difference, as they acknowledge.
94 See Daniel Givelber, Cigarette Law, 73 IND. L.J. 867, 881–82 (1998) (arguing that juries have tended
to view tobacco plaintiffs unsympathetically, “given plaintiff[s’] continuation of a habit which millions seem
capable of breaking”); see also Frank J. Vandall, The Legal Theory and the Visionaries that Led to the
Proposed $368.5 Billion Tobacco Settlement, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 473, 473–74 (1998).
95 See Hans, supra note 31, at 80.
96 See Galanter, supra note 15, at 61 (defining “litigotiation” as the process of “contesting claims in the
vicinity of courts, where recourse to the full process of adjudication is an infrequent occurrence but at every
stage an important option and threat”). This builds on Galanter’s well-known and influential account of the
success of repeat players generally in the legal system. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
97 Galanter, supra note 15, at 61.
98 Id. at 90.
99 Id. at 70–72.
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A related issue is one of bias. One could argue that judges are more apt to
be biased because they owe their office, whether elected or appointed, to
particular interest groups or politicians. Indeed, at the state supreme court
level, there is evidence that campaign contributions to judges affect the
outcomes of cases.100 State trial judges, however, are more often selffinanced,101 and their campaign contributors tend to be made up largely of
local lawyers.102 Although campaign contributions may not influence state trial
judges as much as state supreme court justices, it may be that trial judges favor
repeat players, whether or not they are contributors. Indeed, there is some
anecdotal evidence to support this.103
Part of Galanter’s point, then, may be about juries being less susceptible to
influence. Because the civil jury is constituted for only one case and then
disbands, it would be hard for any interest to gain influence over time.104
100 See, e.g., Damon M. Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 7
ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 281 (2007) (finding that campaign contributions are correlated with judges’ decisions in a
study of decisions by the Supreme Court of Georgia); Kang & Shepherd, supra note 58 (finding that the more
money judges elected in partisan elections receive from business interests, the more likely they are to decide in
their favor); Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623 (2009) (finding
evidence that state supreme court judges facing reelection from either Republican or Democratic voters decide
cases consistent with their respective preferences and that campaign contributions made judges more likely to
support the contributing interest groups’ preferences).
101 See CAL. COMM’N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, THE PRICE OF JUSTICE 64, 67 (1995), available at http://
policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/216.pdf (finding in a study of Los Angeles County superior court
elections that candidates and their families contributed 46% of campaign dollars, the number jumping to 50%
for candidates for open seats and 53% for candidates challenging incumbents); Owen G. Abbe & Paul S.
Herrnson, How Judicial Election Campaigns Have Changed, 85 JUDICATURE 286, 290 (2002) (finding, based
on nationwide survey responses, that trial court candidates contribute about 46% of their own campaign funds,
a much greater amount than the 27% provided by appellate and supreme court candidates). But see Marlene
Arnold Nicholson & Norman Nicholson, Funding Judicial Campaigns in Illinois, 77 JUDICATURE 294, 298
(1994) (reporting in a study of all levels of judicial election funding in Illinois that the percentage of trial court
candidates using self-funding in 1990 amounted to 89% of candidates outside Cook County but only 27% of
candidates within Cook County).
102 See CAL. COMM’N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, supra note 101, at 67 (providing that 45% of superior
court candidates’ outside donations came from attorneys, who were especially active in more competitive and
uncertain open-seat races); Nicholson & Nicholson, supra note 101, at 297 (finding that the largest source of
funds for trial judge campaigns in Illinois came from attorneys, who mostly made modest contributions
between $150 and $300). Meanwhile, Abbe and Herrnson’s study suggests that outside parties and interest
groups, including political parties, labor unions, and business organizations, are about twice as active in higher
court elections than in trial court elections. Abbe & Herrnson, supra note 101, at 294.
103 For an anecdotal account of the importance of facilitative relationships between a divorce lawyer and
judge, see Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer’s Office, 20 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 93, 102 (1986). For an account in the criminal context, see Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining
Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2480 (2004).
104 See Partlett, supra note 36, at 1423 (“[The jury’s] shifting and impermanent composition restricts the
ability of powerful factions and government from suborning the judicial process.”). On the other hand, judges
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Again, though, Galanter is not talking about what happens at trial, so there has
to be an account of how this gets filtered back into the settlement process—an
account Galanter does not appear to provide.
Perhaps the idea is that the repeat players have an interest in moving cases
along and are therefore too willing to settle. On the plaintiffs’ side, perhaps
lawyers value the monetary aspects of the litigation to the exclusion of the
value of demanding accountability and answers for wrongs—a value that,
research shows, many plaintiffs want vindicated in litigation.105 Indeed, there is
evidence from a variety of contexts that repeat players are particularly inclined
toward settlement.106
But there are other factors that weigh against viewing the jury as a check on
repeat players. Recall that the civil jury is not just a lay set of decision makers
versus a professional decision maker (the judge), though that is, of course, one
major distinction.107 It is a particular set of decisions—liability or not, and an
may have greater institutional checks to guard against favoritism or the appearance thereof. See Dan Markel,
Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1426–27 & n. 19 (2004).
105 See FRANK A. SLOAN & LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (2008); Frank B. Cross, In
Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2000); Gillian K. Hadfield, The September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund: “An Unprecedented Experiment in American Democracy” 15 (Univ. of S. Cal. Legal
Studies Working Paper Series, Paper No. 3, 2005), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1028&context=usclwps.
106 See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1529–45 (2009)
(providing an account of how repeat players can collude to settle claims cheaply); see also Janet Cooper
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497,
558–66 (1991) (detailing similar repeat-player effects on settlements in securities litigation); Ronald J. Gilson
& Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1994) (suggesting that, because of reputational concerns, repeat-player lawyers have
incentives to act cooperatively and help clients avoid the prisoner’s dilemma in litigation); Jason Scott
Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation? Evidence from Federal Civil Litigation, 31
J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (2002) (finding that, in federal civil cases, attorneys with a history of interaction settle more
frequently and have disputes of shorter duration). Analogous accounts in the criminal context can be found in
other works. See Bibas, supra note 103, at 2480–81 (describing the effects that relationships between
prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel have on plea bargaining); Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and
Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 913 (2006) (describing the incentives that
repeat-player “insiders” possess, which reward cooperation and quick disposition of cases); Allison Orr
Larsen, Bargaining Inside the Black Box, 99 GEO. L.J. 1567 (2011) (comparing one-shot juries to repeat-player
prosecution and defense lawyers who may seek to develop a reputation as cooperative).
107 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design,
87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 558 (2002) (discussing the value of lay decision making versus professional decision
making); see also Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 33, 39–41 (discussing the negative consequences of lay decision making); Laurens Walker & John
Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 580 (1987)
(“Knowledge of certain topics, therefore, appears not to be common among lay factfinders, and what passes
for knowledge in other areas may be bogus.”). But see Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult
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amount in damages—issued in a particular way, through a verdict sheet that
does not provide reasons. In contrast, when judges rule on liability after a trial,
they will often provide reasons.108
The difference is important. For one, a decision from a judge on a mixed
question of law and fact is more vulnerable on appeal than a decision from a
jury. Part of this is simply greater deference to the jury, but one of the
justifications for such deference is the desire to treat the “black box” of the
jury as sacred. For another, decisions by judges, whether published or not, are
more susceptible to being used by litigants and lawyers going forward as
precedent, even if the decisions of trial judges do not have stare decisis weight
in other courts.109 To be sure, jury verdicts are reported on as well and can
serve as a kind of precedent for how other juries might rule in the future.110
But the decisions and reasons of judges, which can be summarized in local
legal newspapers, are a more accessible version of the law to litigants and
lawyers who are not repeat players.111 In other words, the black-box feature of
the civil jury gives repeat players an even greater advantage.112 As people who
are regularly in the courtrooms, repeat-player lawyers have a better feel for
what has happened with past jury trials—they may have even interviewed
jurors in trials of their own—than those who are “one-shotters,” who may even
come in from other jurisdictions.113

Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 773 (1991) (“[J]urors are generally competent
and conscientious . . . .”).
108 Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 635 (1995) (“[W]hen judges write
opinions, they seek to justify their conclusions, and they do so by offering reasons.”); see also Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007) (“[The] requirement [to provide reasons] reflects sound judicial practice.
Judicial decisions are reasoned decisions. Confidence in a judge’s use of reason underlies the public’s trust in
the judicial institution. A public statement of those reasons helps provide the public with the assurance that
creates that trust.”). For another account of the benefits of judicial reasoning, see Chad M. Oldfather, Defining
Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 140 (2005).
109 Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at
157, 170 (“[A]n important role for the external observer and even the government still exists. In addition, if
external monitoring is negligible or minimal, we should not be surprised to see internal norms of behavior
evolve away from externally stated rules.” (footnote omitted)).
110 See, e.g., Ben Depoorter, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect of Civil Settlements,
95 CORNELL L. REV. 957, 967 (2010) (discussing how there is a market among trial lawyers for publications of
jury verdicts).
111 See Joel B. Grossman et al., Do the “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 803
(1999).
112 See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
113 See supra note 106; see also Grossman et al., supra note 111, at 803–04 (summarizing some of the
advantages that repeat players have in the civil justice system).
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The argument here is not that the civil jury clearly benefits repeat players.
One can certainly counter that repeat-player lawyers who have relationships
with judges might have an advantage in a bench trial. My claim is simply that
it is not so clear that the civil jury is the great check on repeat-player influence
that Galanter suggests.
On the whole, it is not clear that the function of the jury as a check on
governmental and private power, and repeat players generally, can bear very
much weight.
II. LEGITIMACY AND COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY
Perhaps the most pervasive theme in justifying the civil jury is that it
provides democratic legitimacy.114 How exactly this argument works, though,
is often unclear in the literature. In this Part, I try to break down the argument
into its component parts and evaluate it based on the existing evidence.
This Part will require a brief excursion into democratic theory. As leading
democratic theorist Jane Mansbridge has explained, “When empirical political
scientists want to answer the question of how well a political system meets
democratic norms, they need a democratic theory that will clarify those norms
in ways that make it easier to tell when real-world situations conform to or
violate them.”115 The theoretical discussion, though, will remain heavily
grounded in the civil jury’s contemporary functions and practices.
Political legitimacy is generally analyzed as two distinct concepts:
normative legitimacy and sociological legitimacy.116 The sociologicallegitimacy claim is an empirical claim that citizens perceive the civil justice
system as more legitimate and more fair than a system without a civil jury.
We will start, though, with the normative-legitimacy claim. The normativelegitimacy claim is that the outcome of a particular case, or the system as a
whole, is worthy of being followed and ought be considered fair because of (a)
the identity and selection of the decision maker, (b) the nature of the process
114 See Royal Furgeson, Civil Jury Trials R.I.P.? Can It Actually Happen in America?, 40 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 795, 803 (2009); Nathan Seth Chapman, Note, Punishment by the People: Rethinking the Jury’s Political
Role in Assigning Punitive Damages, 56 DUKE L.J. 1119, 1121 (2007) (recognizing the “jury’s important
political role in the republic as a democratic source of morality”).
115 Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515, 525 (2003).
116 For an account of the distinction between normative and sociological legitimacy, see Daniel Bodansky,
The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93
AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 601 (1999).
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that led to the outcome, or (c) the fact that both are consistent with democratic
norms. This is the political component of the normative-legitimacy claim.
This argument is essentially an “ascending” theory of legitimacy emanating
from the will or agreement of the people.117 In contrast to medieval
government structures that were given legitimacy through the “divine right of
kings” (that is, the idea that legitimacy descended from the divine), the jury of
lay people—either through its deliberation or its representativeness—ascends
to give legitimacy.118
There is also frequently an epistemic component to the legitimacy claim.
The idea is that the normative legitimacy of the civil jury is derived in part
from the belief that the decision-making process is likely to get the “right” or
“best” answer.119 Combined, let us say that the political and epistemic
components make up a claim about the strength of the jury’s “democratic
pedigree.”120
Let us also pause on how these normative-legitimacy and sociologicallegitimacy claims both relate to one another and cash out for a real-world
analysis of the civil jury as a political institution. As to normative legitimacy,
the claim is that elites—legal scholars, judges, political scientists, and elected
officials—rely on the belief that the civil jury has a stronger democratic
pedigree than judges to support the idea that an important political function of
the civil jury is to provide something called legitimacy or the perception of

117 EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE 146
(2005); WALTER ULLMANN, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 30 (1975).
118 RUBIN, supra note 117, at 147, 157–60 (describing and criticizing the theory of legitimacy behind
deliberative democracy).
119 The political theorist David Estlund has written about the concept of “epistemic proceduralism” as a
justification for democracy more broadly. See ESTLUND, supra note 36, ch. 6. Indeed, he uses a discussion of
the criminal jury to help illustrate his broader theory. See id. at 136–44. It is essentially a normative-legitimacy
claim: a political system is worthy of being obeyed by the citizens who are subject to it because of the virtue of
its process.
This epistemic component clearly overlaps with evaluating the civil jury as an adjudicative institution.
However, it is necessary to consider it here, at least to a certain extent, because it is part of the basis for the
legitimacy claim underlying the civil jury’s value as a political institution.
120 See Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment, Democratic Pedigree,
and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) (“Collectively, a policy’s political
authority and epistemic authority comprise what I call that policy’s ‘democratic pedigree.’”).
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fairness—what we are referring to as sociological legitimacy—to the
system.121
As to the sociological-legitimacy claim, the idea is that broad and deep
support for the civil justice system is a desideratum for a number of possible
reasons, including cooperation with the civil justice system itself and, perhaps,
compliance with the underlying norms or rights that the civil justice system
seeks to protect or promote.122 The discussion here, though, does not rely on
any particular claim about the relationship between normative legitimacy and
sociological legitimacy—it may well be that elites are wrong that democratic
pedigree has anything to do with sociological legitimacy.123 But the precise
relationship is not necessary to lay out the basic arguments for the normative
and sociological legitimacy of the civil jury and begin to evaluate them based
on the available empirical evidence.
A. Normative Legitimacy
The claims about the normative legitimacy of the civil jury
distinct democratic ideals, representative democracy and
democracy,124 and two distinct democratic processes to reach an
case, an aggregative account for the representative-democracy

trade on two
deliberative
outcome in a
model and a

121 See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 7 (1966); Developments in the Law—
The Civil Jury, supra note 28, at 1433–36; see also Charles P. Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, 5 VAND.
L. REV. 150, 157–59 (1952).
122 Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Mainman, In Search of Legitimacy: Toward an Empirical Analysis, 8
LAW & POL’Y 257, 258 (1986) (“[V]oluntary compliance is the fundamental observable indicator of
legitimacy.”).
123 The sociological legitimacy of the civil jury among average citizens may have to do more with movies
like Twelve Angry Men, TV shows like Law & Order, and other aspects of popular or legal culture. (I
recognize my examples are examples of criminal juries, but I am not sure how many citizens make the
distinction.) Or it may mostly have to do with individual citizens’ experiences with jury duty and the
experiences of their friends and family. These are important questions, but I do not consider them in any detail
here.
124 These two ideals are not necessarily in tension, but they tend to be in much of democratic theory, and I
believe they are best conceived that way here. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 281–82 (1998) (outlining the fight over “the
Madisonian heritage” between pluralists and civic republicans). One could also argue for a third conception:
that it is direct democracy at work with the civil jury. Citizens themselves, not representatives, are making the
laws to govern their rights and responsibilities. But as Richard Primus has pointed out in the criminal context,
it is not direct democracy because the jury is actually not making any rules to govern its own conduct. See
Richard A. Primus, When Democracy Is Not Self-Government: Toward a Defense of the Unanimity Rule for
Criminal Juries, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1417, 1422–23 (1997). To be sure, the jury verdicts act as “precedent”
in a loose sense, a signal of what a future jury might do. Even then, though, I think the jury is better thought of
as doing the law-applying function, not law making.
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“pure” deliberative account as part of the deliberative-democracy model.125 I
consider reference to the ideals as the political component and reference to the
processes as the epistemic component of the normative-legitimacy claim. Note
that I am not claiming that the civil jury is best described as either an
institution of representative democracy or an institution of deliberative
democracy. I am claiming that the legitimacy claims for the civil jury trade on
or invoke ideals associated with these competing conceptions and rely upon
related models of the decision-making process that are also in tension.
1. Representative Democracy
a. The Political Ideal(s)
The concept of representation generally, and in political theory specifically,
is used in a variety of ways.126 In the context of the civil jury, normativelegitimacy claims appeal to representation in at least three distinct ways: (1)
descriptive representation, (2) symbolic representation, and (3) substantive
representation.127 The normative force of the first, though, drives the other two,
and so I will focus on it here. Later, I consider whether judges come closer to
some kind of ideal of representative democracy.128
Descriptive representation is simply the claim that the civil jury looks like
the community from which it was drawn. To the extent that twelve people can
represent a cross section of the community on things like gender, race, and
ethnic background, we say that the jury represents the community.129 Other
125 The literature in democratic theory frequently refers to aggregative and deliberative accounts as
competing conceptions or norms of democracy. See, e.g., IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY
10 (2003) (describing these as competing conceptions of how to get to the “common good”).
126 See Suzanne Dovi, Political Representation, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/fall2011/entries/political-representation (last modified June 24, 2011) (“The concept of political
representation is misleadingly simple: everyone seems to know what it is, yet few can agree on any particular
definition. In fact, there is an extensive literature that offers many different definitions of this elusive
concept.”).
127 These terms are all from Hanna Pitkin’s classic book, HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION (1967). A version of substantive representation is called “gyroscopic representation,”
presented and explored by Jane Mansbridge in Rethinking Representation. Mansbridge, supra note 115, at 521.
128 See Mansbridge, supra note 115, at 515 (“Conceiving of democratic legitimacy as a spectrum and not
a dichotomy, one might say that the closer a system of representation comes to meeting the normative criteria
for democratic aggregation and deliberation, the more that system is normatively legitimate.”).
129 See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (“We accept the fair-cross-section
requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and are convinced that the
requirement has solid foundation.”); Laura Gaston Dooley, Sounds of Silence on the Civil Jury, 26 VAL. U. L.
REV. 405, 418 (1991) (“The jury does not fully represent a fair-cross-section of the community when its very
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arguments depend more on the jury being “a cross section of normative
viewpoints.”130 In either sense, we can think of a jury as akin to a minilegislature under a pluralist theory of democracy, literally sitting around the
table, hashing out differences, and negotiating to reach consensus.131
To what extent is the civil jury actually representative either
demographically or culturally? Several empirical studies have suggested that
juries are not very representative bodies demographically.132 Much of the
difficulty in achieving a representative jury stems from methods of selecting
jury pools. Voter-registration lists are commonly employed, but those lists tend
to underrepresent minorities, the poor, and the less educated.133 Empirical
evidence has suggested that supplementing voter-registration lists with lists of
licensed drivers and other sources may still not be effective in creating

structure silences the voices of perhaps the largest group within it.”); Haddon, supra note 36, at 98–103
(arguing for the promotion of “authentic representation of racial and social groups to increase awareness of
difference in the ways we approach the world” on juries).
130 Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2409 (1990) [hereineafter Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice]. Wells
uses this idea to help explain why juries are particularly well-suited to decide torts cases. Id. at 2351–52; see
also Catharine Pierce Wells, A Pragmatic Approach to Improving Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1447, 1463–64
(2001) (explaining the usefulness of juries in accident tort cases, in which chaotic disputes involving intense
emotions, conflicting testimony, and scattered perceptions can be resolved through reasoned discourse
between people who themselves have different sympathies).
131 The tort scholar Martin Kotler defends the legitimacy of the jury’s role on these grounds in an attempt
to argue that the alternative to legislatures doing law making in tort is not necessarily judges (who, he argues,
lack democratic legitimacy) but juries, which have an attractive democratic pedigree. See Martin A. Kotler,
Reappraising the Jury’s Role as Finder of Fact, 20 GA. L. REV. 123, 161 (1985). But see Dan Markel, State,
Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death Row and the Abolition of the Death
Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 407, 445 (2005) (arguing that former Illinois Governor George Ryan’s
blanket commutation of death sentences was more democratic than the jury death sentences themselves
because a jury is “not strictly speaking a democratic body, nor are they truly an effective cross-section of the
political community that passes the laws in their names”).
132 See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan et al., Measuring a Fair Cross-Section of Jury Composition: A Case Study of
the Southern District of New York (March 14, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Emory Law
Journal) (finding that African-Americans and Latinos were underrepresented in the jury pool of the Southern
District of New York, while whites were overrepresented); Joanna Sobol, Note, Hardship Excuses and
Occupational Exemptions: The Impairment of the “Fair Cross-Section of the Community,” 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
155, 231 (1995) (arguing that, because of the economic-hardship exemption, “in order to be complete, to
produce a real cross-section of America, more must be done to include the working class”). Recently, many
states have reduced occupational exemption from jury duty; however, the current state of jury duty is still such
that “[c]urrent jury practice renders jury service voluntary through hardship, occupational, and other
exemptions.” Richard M. Re, Note, Re-Justifying the Fair Cross Section Requirement: Equal Representation
and Enfranchisement in the American Criminal Jury, 116 YALE L.J. 1568, 1602 (2007) (noting that many
occupational exemptions still very much exist and pass the “compelling state interests” standard).
133 Stephanie Domitrovich, Jury Source Lists and the Community’s Need to Achieve Racial Balance on
the Jury, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 39, 42 (1994).
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representative pools.134 Even if source lists appropriately reflect a community’s
diversity, moreover, there are further obstacles to jury representativeness in the
selection process. There is evidence that minorities are more likely than whites
to have outdated addresses; less likely to respond to mailed questionnaires or
summonses; and more likely to be disqualified or excused from jury service
because of a criminal record, lack of proficiency in English, financial or
transportation difficulties, and child-care obligations.135
Besides demographics, research shows that people are increasingly
“sorting” themselves according to values and lifestyle. That is, it is not only
that we have red and blue states.136 We have red and blue counties—and, even
further down than that, census tracts and zip codes.137 The sorting is not
necessarily based on political views but on values like individualism versus
134 See G. Thomas Munsterman & Janice T. Munsterman, The Search for Jury Representativeness, 11
JUST. SYS. J. 59, 74 (1986); John P. Bueker, Note, Jury Source Lists: Does Supplementation Really Work?, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 390, 421 (1997) (“Taken as a whole, the empirical evidence presented refutes the claim that
using multiple source lists improves minority representation, at least when the second list is a list of licensed
drivers.”). Despite problems of underrepresentation, however, the use of voter-registration lists alone has
regularly withstood constitutional scrutiny under the fair-cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment.
See Domitrovich, supra note 133, at 56–64.
135 See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community
Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 355–56 (1999).
136 This terminology became popular following the 2000 general election. See, e.g., David Brooks, One
Nation, Slightly Divisible, ATLANTIC, Dec. 2001, at 53, 53 (observing the 2000 electoral map that featured “big
blocks of red” and “brackets of blue”).
137 See BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US
APART 129–59 (2008) (discussing the homogenization or balkanization of groups of people at the city, county,
or community level); see also Claude S. Fischer et al., Distinguishing the Geographic Levels and Social
Dimensions of U.S. Metropolitan Segregation, 1960–2000, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 37, 53–54 (2004) (noting that,
although the traditional income and class segregation is between cities and suburbs, “differences among
suburbs sharpened” as well); Joel Lieske, Regional Subcultures of the United States, 55 J. POL. 888 (1993)
(arguing that—based on packages of variables such as race, social structure, and religious affiliation—the
United States can be divided into a number of homogenous subcultures that vary by geographic region);
Douglas S. Massey, The Age of Extremes: Concentrated Affluence and Poverty in the Twenty-First Century,
33 DEMOGRAPHY 395, 399, 407 (1996) (arguing that the twenty-first century will be marked by “geographic
concentration of affluence and of poverty” and that “the social worlds of the poor and the rich will diverge to
yield distinct, opposing subcultures”); Charles R. Tittle & Thomas Rotolo, Socio-Demographic Homogenizing
Trends Within Fixed-Boundary Spatial Areas in the United States, 39 SOC. SCI. RES. 324, 335–36 (2010)
(noting that homogenization at census-tract and county levels is most prevalent for “social rank” variables,
such as education, occupation, and income).
Data shows that the recession of the late 2000s has increased homogenization among subcultures, at
least with respect to some variables, such as race and income. Daniel T. Lichter et al., The Geography of
Exclusion: Race, Segregation, and Concentrated Poverty 17 (Nat’l Poverty Ctr. Working Paper Series, Paper
No. 11–16, 2011), available at http://npc.umich.edu/publications/u/2011-16%20NPC%20Working%20Paper.
pdf (“[T]he poor are increasingly sorted into high-poverty cities, small towns, and rural places, while the
nonpoor are being redistributed into nonpoor communities.”).
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communitarianism, the kinds of values that research shows influence decisions
in civil justice.138 So we should be cautious about the extent to which we are
expecting diversity of “normative viewpoints” in a randomly selected twelveperson jury drawn from a particular county.
So far, we have been talking about the extent to which a jury is
representative in the sense that a range of backgrounds or experiences are
accounted for or reflected—what is referred to as descriptive representation.
But there is another way of talking about representation in democracy, and that
is of “acting for” or on behalf of the community.139
The jury is seen as doing this symbolically, but might judges better
approximate this norm of representation substantively?140 After all, most state
trial court judges are elected,141 and this might better fit the norm of
representative democracy compared to unelected jurors who in some sense
represent their community but know they will never be accountable to anyone.
Elections are, after all, the fundamental legitimator of contemporary
representative democracy—the link between the people and those who exercise
power.142 One could argue that random selection serves the function of
representation as well or better,143 but without more descriptive representation
on actual juries, this claim is hard to make.
138 The Cultural Cognition Project has both mapped these values and found that they influence outcomes
in civil cases. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils
of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 871–73, 890–906 (2009) (discussing the possibility of juries
either being dominated by or excluding subcultures and noting that the “no reasonable juror” standard must
take into account the possibility of a jury populated by “members of [a] subcommunity” who might see things
a different way).
139 See PITKIN, supra note 127, at 114–15 (referring to “acting for” as a substantive conception of
representation); Mansbridge, supra note 115, at 520–22. Mansbridge uses the term in the context of a
representative who is chosen by members of the community. Id. at 521.
140 See PITKIN, supra note 127, at 118 (“What we have here is representation as the substance, or content,
or guiding principle of action.”).
141 Of all state trial judges, about 80% are elected. See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’
Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1105 (2007) (finding, based on national data compiled by the National
Center for State Courts in 2004, that 41% of state trial judges are elected in nonpartisan elections and 38% are
elected in partisan elections). Among states that elect trial judges, nine employ partisan elections and eighteen
hold nonpartisan elections. See BERKSON ET AL., supra note 55.
142 See James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing Popular Sovereignty Under
the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 189, 222 (1990) (asserting that republican governments derive
legitimacy from elections because they express the people’s consent to a government consisting of particular
individuals, enact the rules of decision to which people have agreed to elect their leaders, and provide data
about the people’s wishes in order to make their choices).
143 Indeed, one could even argue that this is akin to direct democracy—the strongest pedigree of them all.
In Athenian democracy, though the legislative assembly consisted simply of citizens who wanted to
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Even appointed judges are arguably more democratic than juries. After all,
the judges are appointed by elected officials.144 Ostensibly, voters know, when
voting for governor, for example, that appointing judges is part of the job, and
if voters think that the governor is doing a bad job of this, she will be thrown
out.
There are strong counterarguments, though, to the judges having a strong
democratic pedigree. One is that elections for state trial judges have very few
elements of true democracy. The elections are only contested about two-thirds
of the time,145 there is frequently very little information available to the
electorate about the candidates,146 and turnout tends to be very low.147 Often

participate, the Executive Council—the body that ran the legislature—was chosen by lot, just like
contemporary juries in the United States. See Richard G. Mulgan, Lot as a Democratic Device of Selection, 46
REV. POL. 539, 540–42 (1984) (describing positions filled by lot in ancient Athens, including the Executive
Council, jury, and various public offices); Richard A. Posner, Judicial Autonomy in a Political Environment,
38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 2 (2006) (“Athens really was a pure democracy. There was no legislature in the sense of a
body of representatives; the citizens were the legislators, just as they are in the case of our modern referenda.
Any citizen who chose to attend the Athenian Assembly would be a participating legislator.”).
144 In fifteen jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia), governors appoint state trial judges after
candidates are screened and submitted by judicial nominating commissions. See BERKSON ET AL., supra note
55. Maine and New Jersey allow the governor to appoint all judges without use of a judicial nominating
commission. Id. In South Carolina and Virginia, legislatures directly appoint trial judges. Id. Four states
appoint only some trial judges. Id. In Arizona, the governor appoints judges in larger counties, and judges are
chosen in nonpartisan elections in smaller ones. Id. Indiana varies based on county and type of court; Kansas
uses either partisan elections or appointment through judicial commissions based on the district; and Missouri
uses mainly partisan elections, but five counties use commissions. Id.
145 Abbe & Herrnson, supra note 101, at 288 tbl.1 (finding 30.8% of trial court elections uncontested
nationwide, compared to only 9.1% of appellate and supreme court contests). But see Schotland, supra note
141, at 1092 (suggesting that California superior court elections, which have seen candidates contest far fewer
than 5% of seats, are typical). Even when elections are contested, they often are not very competitive. See
Abbe & Herrnson, supra note 101, at 288 & tbl.1 (finding about 30% of trial court elections to be
“uncompetitive,” defined as candidates not receiving between 40% and 60% of the vote). Even though
retention elections are by definition uncontested, empirical analysis has demonstrated that sitting judges are
retained in an extremely high percentage of those elections. See William K. Hall & Larry R. Aspin, What
Twenty Years of Judicial Retention Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 343–44 (1987) (finding, in a
study of 1864 trial court retention elections, that sitting judges were defeated only 22 times and received a
mean affirmative vote of 77.2%).
146 See Marie Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum, Choosing Judicial Candidates: How Voters Explain Their
Decisions, 75 JUDICATURE 300, 300–01 (1992) (attributing the lack of information in judicial elections to
limited campaigns, minimal media attention, and ethics rules barring discussion of policy issues by
candidates); Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr. & Charles H. Sheldon, Voters in Contested, Nonpartisan Judicial
Elections: A Responsible Electorate or a Problematic Public?, 36 W. POL. Q. 241, 246 (1983) (finding in a
survey of Washington primary voters and Oregon general and primary voters that between a third and half of
voters had no information about the candidates; two-thirds of primary-election voters knew none or one
candidate; and one-third of the Oregon general-election voters knew no candidates, one candidate, or got some
names wrong).
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money and backroom deals play a large role in who gets put up by political
parties for election.148 Because judicial elections are low-information contests,
those who do participate are strongly influenced by information provided on
the ballot, such as party affiliation in partisan elections and information that
voters can infer from the names of candidates, including race and ethnicity.149
As for appointed judges, many are selected through a “merit system” that
gives much of the power to select judges to the local bar associations,150 which
have no political accountability. The role of political considerations in such a
system may not be any better than in judicial elections.151 Meanwhile, elected
officials, like governors, rarely hear from constituents about a poor judicial
appointment.152
The claim here, though, is modest. I am not arguing that judges come closer
than juries to the political ideal of representative democracy. Rather, I aim
merely to complicate the picture of the civil jury’s claim to normative
legitimacy on this score.

147 See Philip L. Dubois, Voter Turnout in State Judicial Elections: An Analysis of the Tail on the
Electoral Kite, 41 J. POL. 865, 869, 872 (1979) (finding that, in major presidential and midterm partisan
elections, which themselves garner no more than 55–60% of voters, 90% of those voting also voted in partisan
judicial elections, 70% voted in nonpartisan judicial elections, and just 60% voted in retention elections);
Schotland, supra note 141, at 1092 (“[I]n many states, [elections] are held at times with low turnout and also
suffer high ‘drop-off,’ with many voters not casting votes for these down-ballot offices.”). But see Lovrich &
Sheldon, supra note 146, at 247 & n.5 (providing survey responses in which 77% of eligible voters surveyed
participated in judicial, nonpartisan primary or general elections but noting that the findings do not account for
the possibility of significant response bias).
148 See, e.g., Lopez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 411 F. Supp. 2d 212, 215–29 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(describing the path to becoming a state trial court judge in New York as one where local party leaders
“control the process”), aff’d, 462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006), rev’d, 552 U.S. 196 (2008).
149 See Lawrence Baum & David Klein, Voter Responses to High-Visibility Judicial Campaigns, in
RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 140,
141–42 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007). When voters are knowledgeable about the candidates, however, they are
much more likely to participate in judicial elections. See Nicholas P. Lovrich et al., Citizen Knowledge and
Voting in Judicial Elections, 73 JUDICATURE 28, 32–33 (1989); Lovrich & Sheldon, supra note 146, at 247
(finding that voters who reported having enough information about judicial candidates voted 90% of the time,
while voters who said they had no information voted 46% of the time).
150 See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: CURRENT STATUS tbl.1, 2 (2011), available
at http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Judicial_Merit_Charts_0FC20225EC6C2.pdf. Charts of
the states’ various merit-selection plans show that, while their details vary widely, state and local bar
associations are often employed in the selection of lawyers on the commission, while governors and other
elected officials often select nonlawyers on the commission. See id.; see also COAL. FOR JUSTICE, AM. BAR
ASS’N, JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE PROCESS OF CHOOSING JUDGES 6 (2008).
151 See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 675 (2009).
152 See Schotland, supra note 141, at 1092 (“[P]olls over many years have shown startling voter
unawareness of even the most visible judicial candidates.”).
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b. The Epistemic Claim: Information Aggregation
Having explored how juries measure up against the political ideal of
representative democracy, we turn to the epistemic claim. This claim is based
on a theory of information aggregation.153 The idea goes back to Aristotle, who
discussed the concept of “pooling of perspectives,” which we now refer to as
the “wisdom of the multitude.”154 In the context of the civil jury’s role in
deciding normative issues, the idea is that each juror brings her experiences to
the table and that this leads to better outcomes than if any one individual
decided. This is the idea behind the “aggregation model” of the Condorcet Jury
Theorem.155
Under this version of the Theorem, we assume that the probability is
greater than .5 that each juror will answer correctly on what the outcome ought
to be, and so the more perspectives are aggregated, the greater the chances the
decision maker (here, the jury) will get it right. That concept—in plain English,
twelve heads are better than one—applied to the jury has long been taken as
axiomatic by the Theorem.156
The problem is that the model relies on the critical assumption that each
vote or answer is independent of the others.157 But of course, the jurors’ final
votes are not at all independent, having been reached after discussion with one
another. This means that the aggregation model does not apply; we no longer
have reason to believe that each juror has a better than even chance of getting it
right. In fact, various informational cascades and other biases means that
discussion may make it more likely they get it wrong.158
To the extent that jurors make up their minds, or at least adopt a
preliminary view, prior to beginning deliberation with others, the Condorcet
Jury Theorem might well fit. Indeed, research shows that jurors usually make

153

Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 3 (2009).
This term is from Jeremy Waldron. JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 93 (1999). The
idea itself, though, is from Aristotle. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. 3, ch. 11, at 66 (Stephen Everson ed., 1988)
(c. 350 BCE); see generally Vermeule, supra note 153, at 3 (applying Aristotle’s idea of the “pooling of
perspectives” to jury deliberations).
155 See Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
327, 333–34 (2002) (describing the application of the aggregation model to the Condorcet Jury Theorem).
156 See, e.g., Landsman, Appellate Courts, supra note 29, at 885 (“Twelve heads . . . are, pretty clearly,
better than one when it comes to assessing evidence presented in open court.”).
157 See Vermeule, supra note 153, at 6 (“[A] crucial engine behind the Theorem is the independence of
the group members’ views or guesses.”).
158 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 81–91 (2006).
154
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up their minds about a case during the course of a trial,159 and in nine out of ten
cases, the initial straw poll or vote a jury takes predicts the ultimate
outcome.160 However, these preliminary votes only take place, it seems, in a
minority of cases.161
It might well be that if civil juries in America operated like juries in
Brazil—voting by secret ballot without discussion162—then this theory could
provide a basis for thinking that twelve jurors might better identify who was at
fault in an auto accident, for example, than one judge. Or they might be better
at identifying the relevant norm of reasonable driving, even before applying it.
But this theory only works if the viewpoints in each mind are developed
independently, and they are not so in the U.S. civil jury.
It seems, then, that information aggregation cannot support the epistemic
component of the representative-democracy claim, at least in the civil jury
context. This then undermines the claim that a representative jury is a source of
normative legitimacy.
2. Deliberative Democracy
Deliberative democracy is the other democratic ideal that drives the claim
that the jury confers legitimacy. As with representative democracy, we will
consider both the political and epistemic components of the claim. Though the
ideal is an attractive one, the civil jury appears to fall far short in practice.
a. The Political Ideal
In democratic theory, deliberative democracy became prominent in large
part as a reaction to the then-dominant pluralist model, which was associated
with a version of the representative-democracy ideal.163 As two of the leading
159 See GASTIL ET AL., supra note 28, at 82 (citing Ann Burnett Pettus, The Verdict Is In: A Study of Jury
Decision Making Factors, Moment of Personal Decision, and Jury Deliberations—From the Jurors’ Point of
View, 38 COMM. Q. 83 (1990)); Paula L. Hannaford et al., The Timing of Opinion Formation by Jurors in Civil
Cases: An Empirical Examination, 67 TENN. L. REV. 627, 650 (2000) (“[A] substantial portion [of the jurors]
reported making up their minds before final deliberations . . . .”).
160 See GASTIL ET AL., supra note 28, at 82 (citing KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121).
161 See id. at 95.
162 James Kachmar, Comment, Silencing the Minority: Permitting Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in
Criminal Trials, 28 PAC. L.J. 273, 279 n.41 (1996) (“In Brazil, federal juries do not deliberate, but rather,
simply vote by secret ballot at the conclusion of the trial with a majority verdict accepted.”).
163 For some of the important works, see AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND
DISAGREEMENT (1996); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004)
[hereinafter GUTMANN & THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?]; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN
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contemporary deliberative-democratic theorists describe it, deliberative
democracy is
a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their
representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one
another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible,
with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present
164
on all citizens but open to challenge in the future.

Within the jury literature, political theorist Jeffrey Abramson’s book, We,
the Jury, is a leading account of the jury as deliberative democracy.165
Abramson contrasts the individual-impartiality model—where jurors are loci
for reasoned deliberation, and so we try to avoid selecting jurors who have too
much relevant knowledge or a particular perspective—with the representative
or pluralist model that sees the jury as a cross section of the community and
sees multiple perspectives and backgrounds as leading to improved
deliberations and outcomes.166
The jury is in fact the touchstone for the broader theory of deliberative
democracy itself: “When asked to give a practical example of such
deliberation, deliberative democracy theorists often cite the jury as an
institution that embodies the ideal of using collective reasoned discussion to
attain a common verdict.”167

FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg
trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992); JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1980); and Joshua
Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY 87 (David Estlund ed., 2002). The
deliberative-democracy ideal is closely associated in contemporary legal theory with “civic republicanism,” a
school of thought promoted in the 1980s and 1990s by Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein. See Frank
Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97
YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). These scholars tried to rescue republicanism from its classical, elitist roots by
reconceiving it as a mode of governance whose primary purpose, as one scholar put it, is a “definition of
community values and creation of the public and private virtue necessary for societal achievement of those
values.” Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV.
543, 551 (1986).
164 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?, supra note 163, at 7.
165 ABRAMSON, supra note 32. Abramson’s book focuses on criminal juries, though it does not explicitly
limit its discussion to that context. For one of the more extensive discussions in the law reviews on the jury as
deliberative democracy, see Iontcheva, supra note 32, at 346.
166 ABRAMSON, supra note 32, at 125–26 (discussing the central tenets of both theoretical models). As
Abramson put it, “In the end, what is at stake is whether we want jurors to understand their task primarily in
terms of deliberation or representation.” Id. at 140. But see Deborah Ramirez, Affirmative Jury Selection: A
Proposal to Advance Both the Deliberative Ideal and Jury Diversity, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161, 162, 176
(arguing that Abramson’s dichotomy is a false choice).
167 Abramson, supra note 32, at 125.
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Indeed, there are important ways in which the jury appears to meet the
deliberative-democracy ideal. The evidence from both mock and actual jury
deliberations indicates that people treat one another with civility and respect.168
There are also genuine exchanges of views that sometimes affect outcomes.169
Surveys and discussions with jurors after participating in trials show a positive
view of the deliberation process.170 And within the jury room, there is
generally the kind of reason-giving practice that is central to the deliberativedemocratic conception.
But there are also important ways in which civil jury deliberations diverge
from the deliberative-democratic ideal. First, the reasons that justify the
decision are not accessible to the people who are bound by the decision—the
litigants—let alone the public at large. As part of the public nature of
deliberative democracy, reason giving is a critical part of the enterprise. Parties
are expected and even required to state their reasons for their positions, and the
debate about reasons is expected to be the center of decision making.171 As
Habermas put it, “[N]o force except that of the better argument is
exercised.”172 But juries do not give reasons for their decisions, and so their
claim to be deliberative-democracy institutions is on shaky ground.
One can imagine that a “deliberative accountability”173 might support the
jury’s claim to legitimacy, but the jury system would have to be altered
considerably to have juries provide reasons for their decisions.174 The
provision of such reasons would strengthen the civil justice system on
168 See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona
Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 34 (2003) (finding, after reviewing videotapes of jury deliberations in fifty
Arizona civil jury trials, that, although “[o]ccasionally there are minor personality clashes, and occasionally
sharp words, . . . overwhelmingly the jury room atmosphere in [a] sample of Arizona cases is marked by
civility”). But see Nicole B. Cásarez, Examining the Evidence: Post-Verdict Interviews and the Jury System,
25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 499, 524–25 (2003) (finding that, in a sample of articles in which jurors
discussed their deliberations with the press, twenty-one out of the forty that described the tone of jury-room
discussions characterized it as “hostile or discordant,” whereas only eight called the discussions “harmonious,
polite or respectful”).
169 See Marla Sandys & Ronald C. Dillehay, First-Ballot Votes, Predeliberation Dispositions, and Final
Verdicts in Jury Trials, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 175, 188 (1995) (indicating that jurors’ initial instincts
change in 10% of cases).
170 See GASTIL ET AL., supra note 28, at 98–100.
171 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?, supra note 163, at 43–45
(describing “public justification” as central to deliberative democracy and legitimacy).
172 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 108 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1975) (1973).
173 See Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1278–94 (2009)
(discussing the “deliberative accountability paradigm”); see also RUBIN, supra note 117, at 157.
174 Cf. Staszewski, supra note 173, at 1301 (discussing the need for “public-regarding reasons
for . . . policy choices” from elected officials).
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Dworkin’s rule-of-law conception, which envisions law as a theater of debate
where different sides participate in an argumentative practice.175 Under current
practice, where juries do not give any reasons for their decisions and the
standard of review both by the trial judge and appellate courts shields the
jury’s decision from meaningful review,176 this argumentative practice is
undermined.
Moreover, although the decision is binding in the sense that the litigants
have to follow it, it is not binding on anyone else besides the litigants. If a
particular jury decides that a community norm of conduct was violated, the
exact same conduct could be held not to have violated the norm in a different
case.
Deliberative democracy is also characterized by its ongoing and provisional
nature—citizens discuss issues, put forward public justifications, and revisit
the decisions and justifications down the road in light of further developments
and thoughts. As one leading deliberative-democracy theorist put it,
“[D]eliberative democracy is an ongoing and independent association, whose
members expect it to continue into the indefinite future.”177 The civil jury is
together once, makes its decision, and is on its way.
Deliberative democracy is necessarily public: the discussion necessarily
faces outward to fellow citizens, not inward, as in the jury room.178 In the jury
setting, the deliberators cannot discuss what they are doing with those not in
the jury and cannot rely on external information.
In sum, there are many ways in which the jury falls short of the
deliberative-democracy ideal. What about judges?
Some civic republicans, for example, see judges as the ones who would do
the deliberating and reasoning.179 The idea is that judges issue decisions,
175 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 13 (1986) (“Legal practice, unlike many other social
phenomena, is argumentative.”).
176 See Robert P. Burns, Notes on the Future of Evidence Law, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 69, 78 (2001) (“Trial
judges are reluctant to direct verdicts and appellate courts, too, appear increasingly deferential to jury
verdicts.”).
177 Cohen, supra note 163, at 91.
178 See Thomas Christiano, The Significance of Public Deliberation, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY:
ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 243, 256–57 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997) (arguing that
“public deliberation” improves democratic outcomes and treats all members of society as equals).
179 See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 13 (1979); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 74 (1986); Michelman, supra note 163, at 1525.
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members of the public might comment on them in some way, other judges later
issue decisions on similar issues, and the public debate continues as a result.
To be sure, this kind of deliberation is very much subject to information
cascades, where earlier information—say, a prior judge’s decision—is given
more weight than it should be in deciding the best answer.180 But as an
approximation of the deliberative-democracy ideal politically, this more
external focus may well come closer than the private deliberations of the jury.
Judges are certainly charged with articulating the common law, which is
derived from custom and community norms. And though the judges’ roles in
articulating the law, whether the common law or otherwise, are most
frequently attributed to their skill and training in the kind of moral and logical
reasoning that the law involves, there is an alternative view of the judges’
authority to articulate the law—a view held by some of the Founders. And that
is that judges—just like the jury in colonial times—could “stand for” their
community and reason about the common good simply as representatives of
citizens, not because of any particular epistemological claim about access to or
skill at legal reasoning.181
b. The Epistemic Claim: Deliberation
Having seen how the jury falls short of the deliberative ideal, both
absolutely and, possibly, relative to judges, we turn to the epistemic claim: that
the jury’s deliberation provides legitimacy because it is a mechanism well
suited to getting the “right” answer.182 Note that a distinct use of the word
deliberation is at work here: group discussion about reasons for an action or
decision.183 This model relies on empirical research about the benefits of this
kind of deliberation in certain circumstances and the theoretical work of Jürgen
Habermas and others.184

180 See Vermeule, supra note 153, at 32 (“[A] body of precedent generated sequentially may embody
reduced epistemic value”).
181 See SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 135 (1990); David Millon, Judges, Juries, and Democracy, 18 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 135, 157 (1993) (noting that, although “popularism” conceives of the jury as speaking for the
community, the judge’s role in “professionalism” can be seen as “paralleling the role of the jury”).
182 One question is what the right answer means in the context of deciding a civil case.
183 It is important to distinguish this use from “deliberation,” as opposed to intuition, as a method of
decision making. That can be done by a single person and has nothing to do with communication.
184 See HABERMAS, supra note 163, at 303–14.
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In what follows, I discuss the relevant research on when deliberation can
improve decision making. The question is how often these preconditions of
high-quality deliberation hold true in the civil jury.
Cognitive Diversity. The benefits of deliberation are tied significantly to
what is called “cognitive diversity” in the group.185 For twelve heads to be
better than one, those heads have to think differently in order for the group to
benefit from different perspectives. Though cognitive diversity is correlated
with racial and gender diversity,186 the best way to maximize cognitive
diversity is to have a variety of occupational and educational backgrounds in
the jury.187 We have little evidence as to the extent to which this is the case in
civil juries.
Decision Rule. In most jurisdictions, civil juries must have either unanimity
or an 80% supermajority to reach a verdict.188 Some evidence, though,
indicates that majority rule is better at producing high-quality deliberation than
the unanimous or near-unanimous rules that prevail.189 The reason is that
majority rule allows dissenters to speak up without fear of being ostracized as
holding up the consensus.190 Where there is a unanimity rule, group norms act
to suppress discussion and dissent that might improve decisions compared to a
majority rule.191 On the other hand, there is also evidence that a majoritydecision rule allows dissenters to be ignored.192
Voting Practices. In some cases, civil juries take some kind of vote or straw
poll toward the beginning of deliberations. Research shows that, when such a
vote is taken, the jury then approaches a decision talking about possible
185 See SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS,
FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 290–312 (2007) (describing cognitive diversity and detailing how diverse
perspectives can improve decision making and increase the number of potential solutions identified by a
group).
186 See id. at 305–09.
187 See id. at 302–05 (describing how training and experiences influence how a person interprets
information).
188 See Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723, 740 & n.33 (2001).
189 See Tali Mendelberg & Christopher Karpowitz, How People Deliberate About Justice: Groups,
Gender, and Decision Rules, in DELIBERATION, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY: CAN THE PEOPLE GOVERN?
101, 106–07 (Shawn W. Rosenberg ed., 2007).
190 Id.
191 See, e.g., id.
192 See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: The Behavior of the NonUnanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201, 230 (2006) (concluding that observed civil jury deliberations
“demonstrate that thoughtful minorities are sometimes marginalized when the majority has the power to ignore
them in reaching a verdict”).
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verdicts and compromises, as opposed to discussing the evidence itself.193 If
such a vote is not taken, the jury will tend to discuss different views of the
evidence first, and this is more likely to bring out dissenting views and
information that might not otherwise be discussed.194
Equality of Participation. Research shows that the more different views are
aired, the better the decision.195 Similarly, the more jurors feel that there was a
deliberation where people participated equally and listened to one another
respectfully, the more the jurors feel that the outcome was fair. In other words,
those factors contributing to a high-quality deliberation from an epistemic
perspective have a political-legitimacy benefit as well.196 It is not clear how
much civil juries in practice approach this ideal. Posttrial surveys show that
most jurors tend to think that deliberation was quite good, but social science
research also shows that high-status people tend to talk more than others and
have undue influence.197 And minorities tend to shut down and participate
less.198
Group Decision Making. Finally, there are both benefits and pitfalls of
group decision making generally that need to be considered in evaluating the
jury’s deliberative process. The process is hard to evaluate because of the
relatively few actual jury deliberations that have been observed and the lack of
a metric of correctness to judge any decision.
The benefits of group decision making in the deliberative context include
individuals being able to correct one another’s biases or cancel one another
out. Hearing from multiple perspectives or dissenters can cause people to
rethink their initial instincts and get a better answer.199 On the other hand,
information cascades can lead to certain information that is widely known—
common knowledge—to be overemphasized, while other information that
certain people may have—what are called “hidden profiles”—is never shared
with the group.200 Reputational cascades can also play a negative role, where
193 See Reid Hastie et al., A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for
Punitive Damages, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287, 305 (1998).
194 See id.
195 See supra note 178.
196 See GASTIL ET AL., supra note 28, at 99–100.
197 See Caryn Christensen & Ann S. Abbott, Team Medical Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING IN
HEALTH CARE: THEORY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND APPLICATIONS 267, 273 (Gretchen B. Chapman & Frank A.
Sonnenberg eds., 2000).
198 Id.
199 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 74–84 (2003).
200 Id. at 96; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 158, at 81–88.
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high-status individuals—such as the foreman—can skew outcomes unduly.201
And group polarization can lead the initial views of the majority to become
even more extreme upon discussion.202
In sum, the particular features of the jury that make it unique relative to a
judge—the purported “many-minds”203 benefits of information aggregation
and deliberation—are not likely to support a claim of epistemic superiority
given the way the jury actually functions, unless laypersons have greater
access to community norms, an argument I review below.
B. Sociological Legitimacy
Now that we have reviewed the jury’s claim to normative legitimacy, we
turn to sociological legitimacy. Recall that the sociological legitimacy claim is
an empirical claim that citizens perceive the civil justice system as more
legitimate and fairer than a system without a civil jury. And let us assume that
legitimacy for civil justice is an important goal for at least two possible
reasons: first, legitimacy might affect compliance with the law, and second,
legitimacy might affect the accuracy or fairness of jury determinations in
future cases.204
Are litigants more likely to comply with, or perceive as more legitimate, a
judgment produced by a jury or a judge? We do not have good data to answer
that question right now. Survey data indicate that people prefer juries for civil
as well as criminal cases.205 On the other hand, the federal courts, at least as an
institution, tend to receive fairly strong support: a recent survey indicated that
201

See SUNSTEIN, supra note 199, at 74–81.
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 158, at 92–96.
203 Vermeule, supra note 153 (summarizing and critiquing the “many-minds” arguments).
204 These are certainly examples of areas where, once we have some theoretical and conceptual clarity on
what we think is happening, we would want to test it with more empirical research.
205 See HARRIS INTERACTIVE, JURY SERVICE: IS FULFILLING YOUR CIVIC DUTY A TRIAL? 11 (2004),
available at http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/files_flutter/1272052715_20_1_1_7_Upload_File.
pdf (finding that 75% agreed with the statement, “If I were a participant in a trial I would want a jury to decide
my case, rather than a judge” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Mary Rose’s recent study, sorted by racial
demographics, seems to show that most demographic groups would prefer a jury to try their case, whether
criminal or civil, defendant or plaintiff. Mary R. Rose et al., Juries and Judges in the Public’s Mind: Race,
Ethnicity, and Jury Experience, 93 JUDICATURE 194, 199 (2010). African-Americans without previous jury
experience, however, were more skeptical of the civil jury. Id. But see, e.g., CLARUS RESEARCH GRP.,
NATIONAL VOTER SURVEY: HEALTH CARE REFORM AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 2009, at 8 (2009), available at
http://www.philipkhoward.com/images/uploads/CommonGood_PPT_Clarus-poll-sept10-09_ppt.pdf (finding,
in a 2009 survey, that 53% agree and 41% disagree with the statement, “Lawsuits that involve complex and
technical issues should be decided by expert judges and not by juries” (emphasis omitted)).
202
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62% of Americans had at least some confidence in the lower federal courts.
This might mean federal judges are seen as fair.206
State judges, or judges generally, tend to do slightly less well. Seventy-six
percent of people in one survey believed that campaign contributions affect
how a judge decides issues.207 One might speculate that voters think that
appointive systems are more legitimate, but a recent poll conducted by the
Justice at Stake Campaign indicated otherwise, with approximately 75% of
voters preferring election of judges.208 Another poll by the ABA indicated that
only 32% of Americans had high levels of confidence in judges,209 and polls
also have consistently shown that Americans think the justice system generally
favors wealthy persons.210 On the other hand, there are some indicators that
people support judges exercising their discretion to take cases away from
juries.211
It is difficult to draw conclusions from this kind of survey evidence. In a
world where we have the jury and frequently glorify it, it should not be
surprising that people say they like juries. But that does not do much to answer
the question of what people would think of a world in which judges decided
more issues more often. And it does not answer the question of the legitimacy
of individual verdicts, as opposed to the overall legitimacy of the system.
Why might people be more likely to view jury decisions as fair or
legitimate? Perhaps juries are seen as more free from bias because they have
no stake in the system itself.212 Or perhaps lay people are simply deemed more
worthy of trust than lawyers or elected officials, which many judges are.
206 Sarah C. Benesh et al., Public Perceptions of the Lower Federal Courts 14 (Aug. 3, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443434.
207 See GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH INC. ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE FREQUENCY
QUESTIONNAIRE 4 (2001), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASNationalSurveyResults_
6F537F99272D4.pdf.
208 See id. at 7.
209 See American Bar Association Report on Perceptions of the U.S. Justice System, 62 ALB. L. REV.
1307, 1320–21 (1999).
210 See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1157 (1996).
211 See, e.g., CLARUS RESEARCH GRP., supra note 205, at 5 (finding that 74% agree with judges having
discretion to dismiss lawsuits that “they believe to be without legal merit” before the case goes to a jury).
212 See, e.g., Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Accountability Before the Fact, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 451 (2008) (discussing the politics of reelection and judging); James L. Gibson, Challenges to the
Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy Theory and “New Style” Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 59, 69 (2008) (finding, through survey data, that campaign contributions to judicial candidates
strongly harm the legitimacy of courts). But see Keith J. Bybee, The Rule of Law is Dead! Long Live the Rule
of Law! 18–19, 25, 28–30 (Jan. 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://surface.syr.edu/cgi/
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It might also be that the black box of the jury is a virtue for legitimacy
purposes.213 Because jurors’ identities are not known to the broader public,
they can make difficult decisions and avoid taking the heat.214 In contrast, if
judges were to decide things like whether the Ford Explorer was defectively
designed, for example, they would soon find themselves targets of vitriol—
much like the federal judges who ordered schools desegregated—from
corporate America, Ford shareholders and workers, and the Governor of
Michigan if they decided against Ford or unhappy Explorer owners if the judge
ruled in favor of Ford.215 But as George Priest has pointed out, these kinds of
value-laden decisions are relatively rare in the context of the day-to-day
business of civil justice.216
We might also ask, though, why jury decisions are not perceived as more
legitimate or fair than they are. After all, surveys also indicate that most
Americans think that “plaintiffs get too much”217—and it is juries that are
doing the giving. Perhaps some have been convinced by the business
community that juries have redistributionist tendencies or are otherwise biased
against defendants.
It may also be that certain features of the jury as decision maker cut against
legitimacy. Research by Tom Tyler and colleagues, for example, indicates that
assessments of procedural justice, which includes a sense that decision making

viewcontent.cgi?article=1053&context=lawpub (finding that the public perceives in apparent contradiction
that judges are both political and impartial actors, and suggesting that judges can maintain legitimacy despite
such a tension).
213 See Developments in the Law—The Civil Jury, supra note 28, 1434 (“The transient, ad hoc jury
operates as a black box: jury verdicts are sufficiently opaque and complex to prevent any detailed estimation of
jurors’ deliberative processes.”); Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427, 465 (2008) (relating the
argument that the jury system’s legitimacy would be undermined “were the black box to be opened to public
view”).
214 See Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92
HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1196–97 (1979) (observing that this opacity and complexity is contingent on the
particular institutional features that currently characterize the civil jury system); see also Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933) (“Freedom of debate might be stifled and independence of thought checked if
jurors were made to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the world.”); Note,
Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1983) (arguing that juries’ deliberations
should not be publicly disclosed).
215 See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 17–19, 57–64, 186–89 (1978); Nockleby,
supra note 28, at 8; Kalven, supra note 92, at 1062 (describing the jury’s function here as a “lightning rod for
animosity”). But see George L. Priest, Justifying the Civil Jury, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY
SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 103, 124–26 (disputing the relevance of this argument to all but a handful of cases).
216 See Priest, supra note 215, at 124–26.
217 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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is rule based and consistent, are a key determinant of perceptions of legitimacy
and then compliance.218
So it may be that the structural features of jury decision making—the lack
of reason giving and the concomitant lack of precedential value (meaning like
cases may not be treated alike)—means that jury decisions are perceived as
less legitimate than decisions made by judges. And it is not clear that we have
empirical evidence on point to help us answer how the various legitimacy
strengths and weaknesses of jury versus judge decision making shake out.219
Perhaps the presence of the jury as decision maker is less important in
individual decisions, but it helps secure the legitimacy of that system as a
whole.220 Evidence for or against this is difficult to come by as well. Certainly
we can look at other countries,221 including England, where the U.S. civil jury
originated, and see that its use of judges in civil cases does not appear to have
harmed the legitimacy of their civil justice system.222
218

Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, in 30 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 283, 299–301 (Michael Tonry ed., 2003).
219 See Robbennolt, supra note 11, at 471 (“Compared to the extensive study of the decisionmaking of
jurors and juries, there has been relatively little examination of trial judges’ decisionmaking, and even fewer
studies have directly compared the decisionmaking of juries and judges. While there are reasonable arguments
for why judges and juries might differ in how they make legal decisions, these arguments are, in the absence of
more research, speculative at best.” (footnotes omitted)).
220 See, e.g., Stanley Marcus, “Wither the Jury Trial,” 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 27, 30 (2008) (“I submit to
you that what we are talking about is the very legitimacy of our judicial system in the eyes of our citizens, in
other words, the very foundation of the rule of law in our political culture. I believe we cannot overstate the
importance of the public not only being able to witness the judicial process, but of participating . . . [on the
jury] as well.”); see also DAVID B. ROTTMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN
THE CALIFORNIA COURTS: A SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC AND ATTORNEYS—PART I: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2005) (finding that only service as a jury member increases the average approval of
California courts), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/4_37pubtrust1.pdf; Sherman J. Clark, The
Courage of Our Convictions, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2381, 2439–40 (1999) (suggesting, in the criminal context,
that, by engendering in jurors a sense of responsibility for their judgments, the jury lends legitimacy to the
law).
221 See Hein Kötz, Civil Justice Systems in Europe and the United States, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
61, 73 (2003) (asserting that civil jury trials have “almost disappeared” in England and “withered to
insignificance” in Canada and Australia); Justin C. Barnes, Comment, Lessons from England’s “Great
Guardian of Liberty”: A Comparative Study of English and American Civil Juries, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 345,
345 (2005) (“[T]he civil jury is a dying institution: the United States remains one of the last jurisdictions to
guarantee the civil jury right.”).
222 See Christopher Slobogin, Response, The Perils of the Fight Against Cognitive Illiberalism, 122
HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 4 (2009), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/slobogin.pdf (“European court
systems do not appear to have a major legitimacy problem despite the fact that they routinely rely on judges or
judge–jury panels rather than lay-only juries to answer most factual questions.”); Barnes, supra note 221, at
361 (“It seems the English people did not consider the civil jury all that essential to their liberties, or, perhaps
more realistically, they did not see the jury as essential to the fair adjudication of cases. The difference
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Moreover, the sociological-legitimacy claim is undermined by the fact that
96% of state court civil trials—where most civil trials take place—are bench
trials.223 It may be that the minority of trials that are decided by juries are
propping up the rest of the civil justice system. Or perhaps it is citizens’
mistaken belief that the civil system is made up of mostly or all jury trials that
provides legitimacy. Both of these, though, seem like slender reeds to support
the civil jury’s claim to sociological legitimacy. And at a time when faith in the
civil jury appears to be falling, it seems odd to justify the civil jury based on
the fact that it provides citizens with a sense that the system is fair or
legitimate, or that justice is being done.
To be sure, this is an area where more empirical research would be helpful.
We can imagine experimental studies where individuals are taken through a
mock dispute that is then resolved by a judge or jury, and we can see if it
makes a difference in perceptions of fairness. In doing so, of course, we would
have to simulate how the respective institutions actually work: specifically,
that the judge provides reasons, and the jury does not. Indeed, there is
considerable evidence in the procedural-justice literature indicating that
providing reasons to a person if she does not like the outcome can have a
significant impact in convincing that person that the decision was fair.224
Ideally, we would want a controlled, real-world experiment where cases were
randomly assigned to juries or judges for trial, and perceptions of legitimacy
were measured afterwards.
For now, it appears we ought to be cautious about claiming too much for
the civil jury and its benefits for democratic legitimacy.

between the United States, where the jury right is still seen as one of the great barriers protecting liberties, is
startling to say the least.”). But see Carrington, supra note 29, at 90 (noting that the jury is seldom used in civil
cases in England, Canada, and Australia, but arguing that, compared to the United States, those countries have
different histories, parliamentary systems in which the legislature is supreme, a diminished political role for
courts, and less need for the moral support that arises out of community participation in decisions).
223 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 1127 n.7. The authors attribute this to the state courts’ heavy
domestic relations and estate dockets. Id.
224 Much of this research is done in the workplace context. See, e.g., Robert J. Bies & Debra L. Shapiro,
Interactional Fairness Judgments: The Influence of Causal Accounts, 1 SOC. JUST. RES. 199 (1987)
(examining in organizational contexts the effects of giving justifications on individuals’ judgments of
interactional fairness); Daniel P. Skarlicki & Robert Folger, Retaliation in the Workplace: The Roles of
Distributive, Procedural, and Interactional Justice, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 434 (1997) (examining the
relationship between organizational justice and reactions by disgruntled employees from perceived unfairness).
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III. FROM LOCALISM TO COMMUNITY
We have now seen, then, two principal justifications that have long been
used for the civil jury as a political institution. The check-on-governmentpower justification seems a poor fit for today’s civil justice system. And as a
check on corporate power, the civil jury seems an unlikely candidate given the
evidence that juries and judges decide cases largely the same way.
The civil jury may well provide some democratic legitimacy, but given
falling support and the legitimacy tradeoff that comes from not supplying
reasons, it is hard to have much confidence in this claim. On the existing
evidence, then, neither the check-on-power justification nor the legitimacy
justification appear to be up to the task.
Two important justifications remain: (1) that the jury serves to inject
community norms into the legal system and (2) that jury service educates
citizens for democracy, increasing political and civic engagement. We will
start with the community-norms justification and then turn to the democraticcitizenship justification.
Like the ascending theories of legitimacy from representative or
deliberative democracy, the argument about community norms has political
and epistemic components.225 But the community-norms story is about more
than legitimacy. It is a functional or structural justification and a variant of the
localism justification at the Founding: the importance of preserving local selfrule.226
By identifying, perhaps creating, and certainly applying norms of right and
wrong conduct, the civil jury is exercising a right of self-government to which
it is normatively entitled as, collectively, a representative of the community.227
In generating and applying such norms, the community helps constitute itself
as a community.228 This has value in its own right and also helps generate

225

For an overview of each, see Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90
MICH. L. REV. 685, 694 (1992).
226 Id. (citing Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379, 397 (1981)).
227 Michael J. Sandel, Introduction to LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 5 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984).
228 Id.; see also Sunstein, supra note 163, at 1556 (“[P]olitical participation is not only instrumental in the
ordinary sense; it is also a vehicle for . . . feelings of community . . . .”).
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legitimacy for the institution.229 In what follows, I unpack this argument and
examine its components.
A. Political Ideal
The political ideal is that the civil jury is at the heart of local selfgovernance. It is not simply that its members have unique access to community
norms that already exist. It is that by serving on the jury, its members
participate in the making of such norms, and this very act is part of what helps
constitute a community. That is, a community in a democratic society is one
that works together to govern itself by creating and applying norms that govern
the conduct of members of the community.
This kind of claim can be found in part in Anti-Federalist rhetoric at the
time of the Founding, is perhaps best traced more recently to communitarian
writers such as Michael Sandel, and has been imported into legal theory by
scholars like Gerald Frug.230
1. A Way of Constituting Community
There are a few problems with this claim, though, both conceptually and
empirically. The first question, of course, is what is the relevant community.
With the civil jury, the community is geographic, and in a sense defined
backward with reference to the pool from which the jurors were drawn. In the
context of state trials, where most civil cases happen, the community is the
county. Most state trial courts are organized by county and draw their jurors
from that county.231
Descriptively, there are no doubt places in the country where individuals
conceive of their county as a meaningful community, but it is unclear how
many. Moreover, there is the question of how plausible it is to describe
counties as loci for particular and unique norms. I live in Richmond, Virginia,
near Henrico, Goochland, and Chesterfield Counties. Do each of these counties
229 See Nancy Gertner, Is the Jury Worth Saving?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 923, 928 (1995) (reviewing ADLER,
supra note 36) (“An outcome is legitimate not because of its intrinsic value—its accuracy—but because of lay
participation and the application of lay values to impersonal, neutral laws.”).
230 See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 73–112
(1999); see also Gardbaum, supra note 225 (summarizing and analyzing the various claims about community
in legal theory).
231 Laura G. Dooley, The Dilution Effect: Federalization, Fair Cross-Sections, and the Concept of
Community, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 79, 88 (2004) (comparing federal courts to state courts, which are “organized
by county”).
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have different norms for what constitutes safe driving? Medical malpractice?
Designing defective products? Count me as a skeptic.
Normatively, it is not clear that we want counties to play such a role. The
boundaries of counties have been sites for contestation over issues of race and
class throughout American history, continuing today.232 When more affluent or
white residents want to stop paying taxes for services that benefit poor
minority residents, they will frequently try to get the county line redrawn or
form a separate county.233 The word community and the ability to define norms
for “our community” have a nostalgic appeal. But as many scholars have
pointed out, communities have always been about not just who belongs but
who does not belong.234
Even if we were to change jury pools to be drawn from particular towns or
neighborhoods, as opposed to counties, it is not clear that the communitynorms-as-self-governance story works there either. The story about
communities having the right to self-govern is premised in large part on a
notion of community premised on consent.235 That is, individuals make
decisions on where to live based on a conscious, voluntary choice about what
kinds of values they want to live their lives by.236 Or in economic terms, they
choose a locality that offers them the bundle of municipal services they want at

232

Although there are procedures for annexation, present-day county boundaries are virtually fixed. Binny
Miller, Who Shall Rule and Govern? Local Legislative Delegations, Racial Politics, and the Voting Rights Act,
102 YALE L.J. 105, 114 (1992). For a few examples of the history of county formation, see sources cited infra
note Error! Bookmark not defined.. When counties today do change, typically it is because they are annexed
by a city. Race–income differences are political issues that greatly affect the likelihood of this happening. See,
e.g., Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1115, 1142 (1996) (“[F]ormal boundary lines may make an area’s ethnic composition or social status more
evident, thereby directly facilitating an interjurisdictional sorting . . . .” (citing GREGORY R. WEIHER, THE
FRACTURED METROPOLIS: POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND METROPOLITAN SEGREGATION 87–143 (1991)));
Thomas R. Dye, Urban Political Integration: Conditions Associated with Annexation in American Cities, 8
MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 430, 439–42 (1964) (noting that race and class, categorized by county, may play
important roles in determining where people decide to live).
233 See, e.g., A Georgia County Divided Against Itself, MSNBC.COM (Jan. 25, 2007, 10:14 AM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16773267/ns/us_news-life/t/georgia-county-divided-against-itself/ (describing
a situation in which class differences were an issue in redrawing county boundaries).
234 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
UCLA L. REV. 903, 941 (1994) (“[C]ommunities tend to be exclusionary . . . .”); Richard C. Schragger, The
Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 375 (2001) (“[C]ommunity . . . exists in relation to (and to the
exclusion of) other, equally plausible alternative communities.”).
235 Local government scholar Richard Schragger calls this a “contractarian” account of community. See
Schragger, supra note 234, at 387–93.
236 Id. at 387, 390.

SOLOMON GALLEYS4

1378

9/5/2012 9:06 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1331

the lowest possible tax rate.237 Having done so, the argument goes, they are
entitled to self-govern to maintain control over the norms or values they chose
along with the other members of their community.238
Certainly, it is plausible to see the choice for many of whether to live in a
city or suburb, for example, as having this character of conscious choice about
values or lifestyle. But individuals decide where to live based on a number of
factors, including where they grew up, can find work, and can afford housing
for their families. Some people endure commutes of as much as an hour or
more each way because they prefer a particular lifestyle, but others do so
because that is where they could find an affordable home.
Of course, what people consider their community in the twenty-first
century is far different than what people considered their community in the late
eighteenth. Communities are not only geographic, and when people live and
work in different places, they are less so. As geographic communities have
become more heterogeneous, people identify their neighbors as their
community less often. Indeed, with residents living increasingly far apart in the
suburbs and exurbs, people often don’t know their neighbors at all.
Other bases for communities abound. Communities can be religious, racial
or ethnic, or associated with a shared experience, like where one went to
school. Moreover, with the Internet and social networking, it is easier than ever
for people to form or join new communities based on shared interests or
identities, such as home-schooling parents, gay teenagers, or fans of the teen
heartthrob Justin Bieber.
2. Local Self-Rule and Political Participation
a. Defining Community Norms
The historian William Nelson identifies preserving local self-rule as “[t]he
main function that the jury can serve” even today.239 Here, local self-rule
means simply the ability of political jurisdictions below the state level—
usually municipalities and counties—to make laws governing their community.
But how relevant is this function in contemporary America? The evidence is
mixed. Nelson asserts that “few Americans really care about preserving local
237
238
239

See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Public Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
See Schragger, supra note 234, at 387.
Nelson, supra note 74, at 1662.
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power”240 and that “[s]tates’ rights and the rights of localities . . . come into
play not as values in themselves, but only as means to some other end.”241 But
there is research that shows that citizens do care about federalism values,
independent of the particular outcome on an issue.242 This could translate to the
local level as well.
In this context, though, the argument has to be that citizens care about
retaining lay (not judicial) control over the definition of what conduct is
reasonable and unreasonable, specifically in the instances in which tort cases
most commonly arise: driving, upkeep of premises (slip-and-fall cases),
medical malpractice, and design of consumer products.243 It would be
surprising if citizens felt this way for any of these categories of cases, but let us
consider a few possibilities.
Perhaps medical malpractice is one area where we might want local norms.
In the context of debates over the new federal health care law, one scholar has
suggested that, because “[p]rofessional standards for the practice of medicine
raise religiously and culturally sensitive issues of life and death, physical
privacy, and acceptable risk-taking,” subnational jurisdictions might well take
the lead in regulation.244 He was referring to states, but the same argument
could apply to counties.
Products liability might be another good example. I discussed above
whether it made sense to think about civil juries’ ability to decide issues like
what constituted acceptable risks and warnings in product design as a check
against corporate power.245 But that was based on a conception of the brooding
omnipresence of civil juries nationwide casting their shadows on the decisions
of manufacturers.

240

Id.
Id. at 1663.
242 See Cindy D. Kam & Robert A. Mikos, Do Citizens Care About Federalism? An Experimental Test, 4
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 589 (2007).
243 See STEVEN K. SMITH ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 153177, TORT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES 2
tbl.1 (1995), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/TCILC.PDF (finding that, in the nation’s largest
seventy-five counties, auto cases represented 60.1% of tort cases filed in state courts, premises liability cases
17.3%, product liability cases 3.4%, and medical malpractice cases 4.9%).
244 See Rick Hills, Healthcare and Federalism: Should Courts Strictly Scrutinize Federal Regulation of
Medical Services?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 14, 2011, 11:39 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2011/08/healthcare-and-federalism-should-courts-strictly-scrutinize-federal-regulation-of-medical-services.html.
245 See supra text accompanying notes 89–91.
241
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In this context, the question is whether individual communities—really,
counties—should be able to decide for themselves what are acceptable risks of
product design as an important component of local self-governance.
Probably not. First, as a practical matter, manufacturers cannot make
different product designs and tailor different warnings to different counties.
Second, the norms in this context are unlikely to differ from county to county.
When I buy a Ford Bronco, I would like it to not have a significant risk of
rollover, and I am guessing that people who live in rural Virginia feel the same
way. Similarly, consumers in both red counties and blue counties probably
want to be warned of non-negligible risks of side effects of prescription
medicine. Though to be sure, if things go wrong, there may be differences in
how likely people are to blame the drug company or sue.
Or consider what is frequently a statutory tort under state law: consumer
fraud. Your friendly neighborhood fireworks distributor is advertising his
wares across county lines certainly and often intentionally across state lines. Or
a ski-resort operator runs radio ads in markets that reach multiple counties and
even states, claiming, “Fresh Snow—ski with us, and you’ll have a nice,
smooth ride!” Now it is certainly possible that different counties could have
different norms about how much puffery is permissible. If you want to do
business here, the county says through the jury, you have to live by our rules.
But it makes little sense, as a matter of institutional design, that we would want
the content of a state statute’s mandates to be defined on a county-by-county
basis. With the statute enacted on a statewide basis, county-level definitions
would lack legitimacy or normative force.
Of course, because of the nonprecedential nature of jury decisions, a
formulation and application of a norm in a particular case is not even a
decision by a county at all. It is a decision by a particular jury that could be
contradicted by a different jury in the next courtroom on quite similar facts
involving the very same defendant.
Just as appeals to states’ rights have been largely left behind in favor of
appeals to federalism, the language of local self-rule, in this context, has turned
into an argument about community norms. But it is not clear that there are
many contexts in the civil justice system where defining norms locally ought to
be valued or that the change in label ought to add to the self-rule concept’s
normative appeal.

SOLOMON GALLEYS4

2012]

9/5/2012 9:06 AM

THE POLITICAL PUZZLE OF THE CIVIL JURY

1381

b. Small-Scale Participation
Another argument for the civil jury as a site for community selfgovernance—and perhaps a more appealing one—is an argument about scale.
The argument essentially goes like this: Citizen participation in governance is
important. But in today’s society, individual participation in national and state
affairs is simply not practical; the scale is too big for individuals to participate
in a meaningful way. Therefore, such participation has to happen at a local
level.246
This participation argument has always been one of the primary arguments
in support of localism.247 The civil jury is a well-established site of local selfgovernance, and with its manageable size of twelve people, it has long been
and continues to be an excellent place to achieve this participation.248 So the
argument goes.
This argument seems quite reasonable on its face, but there are a few
questions worth exploring. First, assuming we do want participation in local
self-governance, are the kinds of issues that a civil jury deals with the ones that
are most important for citizens to be engaged in? Recall that, at the time of the
Founding, civil juries did things that were much different, like collecting taxes
or setting land-use policy—the kinds of things that various municipal
governments do now. Perhaps encouraging more community school boards of
the kind they have in Chicago249 or having citizen juries provide input into
budgeting, as they do in British Columbia,250 are better ways to involve
citizens in local self-governance.
Even if we think particular communities do not have norms of conduct,
though, or that a particular community does not have a strong interest in
defining said norms, it may be that there is an interest in a community defining

246 See Schragger, supra note 234, at 398 (associating local participation with a “dualist” notion of
community that “emphasizes the individual’s engagement in a process of collective self-governance”).
247 See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 632–34 (2001). By
“localism,” I mean self-governance at a small-scale territorial level.
248 See Developments in the Law—The Civil Jury, supra note 28, at 1438 (“[T]he jury is valuable not
because of the independent substantive desirability of any particular outcomes that result, but because it is an
institution of democratic procedure, an institution through which ordinary citizens can participate in
government. In this sense, the jury is intrinsically valuable as a concrete manifestation of democratic process.”
(footnote omitted)).
249 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 124, at 411.
250 Kevin O’Leary, The Citizen Assembly: An Alternative to the Initiative, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1489,
1497–98 (2007).
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who ought to take responsibility for what, or attributing blame. In commonlaw-tort terms, we can think of this coming into play in the causation element,
which always has a normative dimension, or perhaps in defenses, such as
assumption of risk. In this sense, perhaps we ought not be troubled that the
available empirical research shows that jurors tend to do “total justice” in tort
cases, taking many different factors into account and not deciding based on a
formal, element-by-element basis.251
Though this makes some sense, the total-justice approach skirts over the
issue of whether the conduct is reasonable, and so risks putting the stigma of
liability on conduct that does not deserve reproach. When combined with the
black box of the jury and the lack of obligation to give reasons, this means that
litigants and the public have little idea what norm was applied or violated.
Rather than helping to constitute community norms, such decisions merely
cloud them if they have any effect at all.
Community norms might also dictate how much certain wrongs or injuries
are worth in damages. Indeed, there is evidence that the amount of damages is
related to the racial composition and income level of people on the jury.252 One
could say that the level of damages is a way that the community sends a
message about how bad the wrong or injury is, and this is an important part of
helping constitute a community—meting out justice, akin to deciding a
sentence in a criminal case,253 is a way of articulating a community’s values.
As a practical matter, though, community values rarely come into play in
damage awards254 because punitive damages are rare, and the only other
category that is indeterminate is pain and suffering. So deciding damages in
civil cases seems like a poor way for members of a community to articulate
their values and participate in government. Small groups of citizens could do
this by participating in discussions of local education, tax policy, zoning laws,
possible changes to social-welfare services provided—the list goes on.255 But

251

See NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS 5 (2000).
See Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Race, Poverty, and American Tort Awards: Evidence from
Three Data Sets, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 51–53 (2003).
253 Juries make the underlying factual findings for criminal cases but generally do not actually decide
sentencing.
254 See Priest, supra note 215, at 112–17 (demonstrating that this was the case in his study of Cook
County juries between 1959 and 1979).
255 Such a suggestion has been made by Professors Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel, among others. Dorf
& Sabel, supra note 124, at 287–89. They call this “directly deliberative polyarchy.” Id. at 288.
252
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estimating the pain and suffering associated with whiplash or a broken leg? I
am not so sure.
B. Epistemic Claim: Local Knowledge
Besides the political claim about a community’s right to define its own
norms as part of a localism or participation ideal, the jury’s access to
community norms is in part an epistemic claim. The civil jury is worthy of
respect, and its results are legitimate, because it is most likely to get it right
when it comes to identifying and applying the relevant community norms.256
The idea that jurors have unique knowledge about the community can be
traced back to the origins of the modern jury and its precursor in the Norman
era.257 Under that model, laypeople were called as witnesses before the judge
because they were thought to have information about the particular incident at
issue or whether the people involved had good or bad character.258 It is this
juror-as-witness concept that is the root of the idea that jurors have unique
access to some kind of local knowledge.259 But though the juror-as-witness
notion faded long ago, the idea of jurors as having access to local knowledge—
referred to generally now as community norms—has remained.260
Steven Hetcher, for example, refers to the “pervasive role that social norms
play in providing grist for the jury’s concrete application of the reasonable
person standard.”261 He describes the phenomenon he calls the “jury norm
effect,” which “allows the norms of ordinary people to exert a direct causal

256 Harry Kalven, a leader of the well-known Chicago Jury Project in the 1950s and 1960s, was a
prominent supporter of this kind of community-norms rationale. See Kalven, supra note 92, at 1058, 1061–68;
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158, 161
(1958).
257 See Stephan Landsman, The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury System, in VERDICT: ASSESSING
THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 22, 25.
258 Id. at 27; Laurie L. Levenson, Change of Venue and the Role of the Criminal Jury, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1533, 1546 (1993) (pointing out that, in Anglo-Saxon law, criminal jurors were chosen “because they were
familiar with the criminal activity in question or the character of the accused persons”).
259 See Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage (pt. 1), 29 OKLA. L. REV. 801, 813 (1976) (describing the origins of
the jury as an “administrative inquest” by which “the government ascertained its rights and obtained
information”); Levenson, supra note 258, at 1546.
260 See Haddon, supra note 36, at 51–52 (identifying the historical significance of jury decision making as
the capacity of citizens to “provide local knowledge from experience and community connection, knowledge
unavailable to the judge or other expert”).
261 Steven Hetcher, The Jury’s Out: Social Norms’ Misunderstood Role in Negligence Law, 91 GEO. L.J.
633, 647 (2003).
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effect over formal legal outcomes.”262 Though he presents his analysis as an
interpretive account, he appears to look favorably upon the jury norm effect.
But it is not clear from Hetcher’s account—and that of the literature more
generally—whether the jury’s community norms are designed to improve legal
outcomes or simply improve liability outcomes.
Let me explain. We might care about injecting community norms because
jurors are epistemically superior in identifying and applying community norms
relative to judges. This might be the case because they are less educated, have
a broader range of life and work experiences, or are simply a collection of
many minds.263 Under this account, jurors will do a better job than judges at
reaching accurate legal outcomes on whether conduct is reasonable according
to community standards. Here, we see the civil jury’s advertised benefits as an
adjudicative institution, not a political one.
One problem with this account, though, is the research that juries and
judges most often decide cases the same way.264 This is in considerable tension
with the claim that juries somehow have unique access to community norms
and will therefore define what conduct is reasonable or unreasonable
differently than judges.265
Further, the community norms in many if not most tort contexts are not
norms that lay jurors have particular access to. Consider each of the major
categories of tort cases: medical malpractice, products liability, premises
liability, and auto accidents.266 Juries are not likely to be experts about
community norms in medical care (medical malpractice), designing consumer
262

Id. at 635.
PAGE, supra note 185, at 405; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE
FOUNDING DOCUMENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 7–8 (2009).
264 See Robbennolt, supra note 11, at 502 (“[T]he decisionmaking of judges and jurors is strikingly
similar. While there is evidence of some differences, there is a high degree of agreement between the groups,
they appear to decide real cases quite similarly, and they show a great deal of similarity in responding to
simulated cases designed to examine a variety of legal decisionmaking processes.”).
265 But see Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1511, 1542 (1992) (“Courts, however, are too far removed from the voice of the citizenry, and judges’
backgrounds are too homogenous and distinct from those of many Americans to ensure that judicially-defined
policy will accord with the public values of the polity.”).
266 At the federal level, products liability cases often compose the majority of tort cases from year to year.
See Key Facts at a Glance: Federal Tort Trials, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/
tables/tortcldtypetab.cfm (last modified June 17, 2012). For a detailed account of all civil claims in federal
district courts by type, see STATISTICS DIV., supra note 15, at 141–43. For a detailed account of civil trials by
case type at the state level in 2005, see LANGTON & COHEN, supra note 15, at 2. For a sample of incoming
civil claims in state courts, see NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 61, at 2.
263
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products or warning about dangers (products liability), or sweeping the floor
and shoveling the sidewalk at a business (premises liability).
Even in the driving context, where the people on the jury are arguably best
equipped to apply the reasonable person standard to conduct, it may well be
that an accident-reconstruction expert would be better suited than a group of
people who drive to decide who was at fault in a particular accident. So the
epistemic-superiority argument for jurors applying community norms rests on
shaky ground.
Meanwhile, the other account of the value of injecting community norms
spins out entirely the opposite story. This account holds that sometimes strict
application of law yields unjust results and that community norms on the right
outcome, courtesy of the jury, yield greater justice.267 This is a justification for
nullification, with little force in the civil context.268
What about intentional or dignitary torts? Perhaps that is where we want
jurors applying the community norms. In certain circumstances, this may be
true. For example, the legal privilege of self-defense to battery varies by region
of the country, and in Southern jurisdictions that retain traces of honor
cultures, individuals do not have a duty to retreat.269 One could argue that
being able to define such norms at a local level is valued by citizens.
But community norms have their downsides. As Robert Post has pointed
out, “[W]ithin our constitutional tradition democracy can not be equated with
majoritarian expressions of popular will.”270 Post distinguishes between
democracy and “popular sovereignty,”271 and it is not so clear that we want
popular sovereignty to be the mechanism for adjudicating ex post what conduct
is reasonable and unreasonable.
In defamation law, it was precisely a concern for community norms
trampling rights that led the Supreme Court to intervene in the context of the

267

Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1650 (2001).
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
269 Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 n.7
(1999); see also JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS
107 (12th ed. 2010) (“The majority have insisted upon a higher importance of the dignity and honor of the
individual and have held that the defendant may stand his ground . . . .”).
270 Robert Post, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 429, 437
(1998).
271 Id. at 437–38. Post distinguishes the two on the ground that “popular sovereignty is defined by
reference to procedural criteria, whereas democracy is defined by reference to substantive values.” Id. at 438.
268
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civil rights movement in New York Times v. Sullivan.272 In that case, an
Alabama jury spoke loud and clear about its norms: Northern elites (the New
York Times) and African-Americans should not criticize elected officials. But
such a defamation verdict, the Supreme Court held, violated the First
Amendment. Defamation is a tort that can frequently be misused to suppress
speech rights.273
Or consider the false imprisonment tort, which today is frequently used in
the context of suspected shoplifting.274 People in a store are stopped and held
by store security guards, and they later bring a false imprisonment claim
against the store if they did nothing wrong. The issue often comes down to
whether what the store did in holding the individual was reasonable,275 and
many of these cases involve the security guard saying that the individual
looked “suspicious”—often a racially coded word.276
In one recent and well-publicized false imprisonment claim, a hospital in
Florida sent an undocumented immigrant back to his home country against his
will because the hospital was having trouble getting reimbursed for his care.277
The jury in Florida was asked whether what the hospital did was reasonable,
and the jury said that it was and ruled against the plaintiff.278 Regardless of the

272

See AMAR, supra note 12, at 243 (noting that the doctrinal rules crafted by the Court in Sullivan
reflected “obvious suspicion” of white Southern juries).
273 See David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s Protection of Self-Defining
Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 75–77 (2012).
274 DOBBS, supra note 14, at 68–69 (explaining that “[f]alse imprisonment is effected in many ways and in
diverse social settings, but not surprisingly it most frequently involves a relatively powerful defendant,” and
offering storekeepers, hospitals, and police officers as examples).
275 See, e.g., Grant v. Stop-N-Go Mkt. of Tex., Inc., 994 S.W.2d 867, 873 (Tex. App. 1999).
276 See, e.g., Hampton v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1055, 1058 (D. Kan. 1997) (involving a
false imprisonment claim arising out of the detention of black plaintiffs in a department store by a security
guard, who began surveillance because one of the plaintiffs was “looking toward the ceiling and looking
around”), aff’d, 247 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2001); Lewis v. J.C. Penney Co., 948 F. Supp. 367, 369 (D. Del.
1996) (involving a claim of false imprisonment by black plaintiffs who were followed and had their bags
searched by security guards because they “displayed nervous behavior, avoided sales help and were shopping
in darkened, deserted areas of the store”); see also Deseriee A. Kennedy, Consumer Discrimination: The
Limitations of Federal Civil Rights Protection, 66 MO. L. REV. 275, 287 (2001) (“Customers of color are
frequently faced with differential security measures based almost entirely on race. Black customers are
followed, stopped, searched, and threatened for looking suspicious, displaying nervous behavior, avoiding
sales help, and shopping in darkened, deserted areas of the store.” (footnote omitted)).
277 This was detailed in a series in the New York Times a few years ago. See Deborah Sontag, Jury Rules
for Hospital that Deported Patient, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2009, at A10.
278 See id.
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merits of these particular cases, they are not cases that call for majoritarian
rule.279
Of course, it is not clear that judges—particularly the elected ones—will do
any better at safeguarding minority rights. Judges may not be attentive to
minority rights in the context of a private law dispute. Indeed, the family law
scholar Vivian Hamilton has suggested that judges ought to go along with
majority norms in private law disputes for legitimacy reasons, while saving
their guardian-of-liberty role for cases where the state is a party.280
While I am inclined to disagree with Hamilton on what judges ought to do,
she may well be right descriptively on how judges do conceive their role. If
appointed, they were put in place by a governor or legislature supported by a
political majority at the time. If elected, of course, they have plenty of
incentive to follow the majority and avoid being associated with protecting
minority rights in anticipation of the next election. On the other hand, a
significant percentage of state trial court elections are uncontested,281 making
this effect perhaps less than it otherwise might be.
IV. BETTER CITIZENS
In this Part, I consider a final justification for the civil jury as a political
institution. This is the argument that was made famous by Alexis de
Tocqueville and is fairly unquestioned in our political and legal culture: jury
service makes better democratic citizens.282 Until recently, there was very little
279 See Haddon, supra note 36, at 31 (“Indeed the reprieve of no jury has been seen as an advantage for
people of color: jury decision-making on more than one occasion, after all, has confirmed that the political
majority devalues the worth of the lives and dignity of outsiders.”); Partlett, supra note 36, at 1423–24 (“The
jury reflects the society from which its members are drawn—its high values and its low.”).
280 Vivian E. Hamilton, Expressing Community Values Through Family Law Adjudication, 77 UMKC L.
REV. 325, 336–37 (2008).
281 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
282 As de Tocqueville put it:

Juries, especially civil juries, instill some of the habits of the judicial mind into every citizen,
and just those habits are the very best way of preparing people to be free.
...
Juries teach men equity in practice. Each man, when judging his neighbor, thinks that he
may be judged himself. That is especially true of juries in civil suits; hardly anyone is afraid that
he will have to face a criminal trial, but anybody may have a lawsuit.
Juries teach each individual not to shirk responsibility for his own acts, and without that
manly characteristic no political virtue is possible.
Juries invest each citizen with a sort of magisterial office; they make all men feel that they
have duties toward society and that they take a share in its government. By making men pay
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evidence on this point, but a significant study by John Gastil and colleagues
has begun to change that state of affairs.283 Still, the empirical research is in its
infancy.
In what follows, I consider the theory behind and empirical evidence for
the connection between jury service and (A) voting and other forms of political
participation; (B) civic engagement and attention to public affairs; and (C)
understanding of different views, or empathy.
A. Voting and Political Participation
Though de Tocqueville focused on the civil jury, the evidence seems to
indicate that civil jurors do not vote more frequently after their jury service.284
It is the criminal jury where we see the positive effects on citizenship,
particularly voting.285 Why might the criminal jury make more of a difference?
It seems likely that the feeling of holding a “magisterial office,” as de
Tocqueville put it—feeling like you are a government official—is significantly
stronger during a criminal trial because the juror is making such a weighty
decision about a fellow citizen: whether to deprive her of liberty.286
Though decisions about liability and damages in a civil trial are certainly
significant for the parties, the consequences are less severe, particularly with
the widespread holding of liability insurance. It may also be that the issues and
witnesses involved in a civil trial are simply less engaging. Eighty-six percent

attention to things other than their own affairs, they combat that individual selfishness which is
like rust in society.
Juries are wonderfully effective in shaping a nation’s judgment and increasing its natural
lights. That, in my view, is [the jury system’s] greatest advantage. It should be regarded as a free
school which is always open and in which each juror learns his rights, comes into daily contact
with the best-educated and most-enlightened members of the upper classes, and is given practical
lessons in the law, lessons which the advocate’s efforts, the judge’s advice, and also the very
passions of the litigants bring within his mental grasp. I think that the main reason for the
practical intelligence and the political good sense of the Americans is their long experience with
juries in civil cases.
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 274–75. This education-of-citizens rationale was also employed by John
Stuart Mill. See JOHN STUART MILL, Considerations on Representative Government, in ON LIBERTY AND
OTHER ESSAYS 205, 254–55 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1859).
283 See GASTIL ET AL., supra note 28.
284 See id. at 47.
285 Id. at 45–46.
286 Another possible explanation is that the attacks on the civil justice system have made civil cases seem
less important or legitimate, and this undermines the sense in which jurors feel they are undertaking a civic
duty. See id. at 171.
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of sampled civil cases involved expert witness testimony playing a key role.287
The battle of accident-reconstruction experts in a car-accident case may not
match the drama of a criminal case.
Indeed, to the extent that the jury is composed of people with diverse
normative viewpoints—often a desideratum in the jury literature—it may even
reduce the likelihood of voting for the jurors who participate. As Diana Mutz
found in her study of people’s social networks, “Having friends and associates
with opposing political views makes it less likely that a person will vote.”288
To the extent that political participation besides voting—becoming active
in a local political party or otherwise mobilizing on issues—is one aim of the
jury as a political institution, it may well make sense to have juries with more
homogeneous viewpoints, not a diversity of “normative viewpoints.”289 Mutz’s
research has shown that individuals with greater “cross-cutting exposure” in
their social networks are less likely to become politically active.290 Possible
theories for this effect include people fearing social conflict as a result of
political activity or people becoming more ambivalent in their political views
as they are exposed to opposing views.291 Indeed, research seems to show that
it is deliberation among like-minded people—what Cass Sunstein calls
“enclave deliberation”292—that leads to collective action.293
B. Civic Engagement (plus Attention to Public Affairs)
For de Tocqueville, it was by forcing people to pay attention to “things
other than their own affairs” through jury service that people would become
less selfish and would become extensively more focused on their community
and polity after leaving jury service.294 We might then see increased civic
engagement and attention to public affairs after jury service, according to this

287 Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Minimalist Approach to the Presentation of Expert Testimony, 31 STETSON
L. REV. 105, 105 (2001).
288 See DIANA C. MUTZ, HEARING THE OTHER SIDE: DELIBERATIVE VERSUS PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY
112 (2006) (“The greater the cross-cutting exposure in the person’s network, the more likely he or she is to
abstain from voting.”).
289 See id. at 133 (“[W]ithin any given individual, enthusiastic participation rarely coexists with ongoing
exposure to diverse political viewpoints and careful consideration of the political alternatives.”).
290 Id. at 112–13.
291 See id. at 102–08 (defining and describing the existing evidence for these two possible theories).
292 Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 175, 177 (2002).
293 MUTZ, supra note 288, at 127.
294 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 274.
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theory. The Jury and Democracy Project investigated this and came back with
interesting findings, summarized below.
In civil trials, jurors who were confused during the trial started paying more
attention to politics and read more about public affairs after the trial. The
theory is one of self-improvement: jurors decided, consciously or otherwise,
that they needed to learn more about government or the law.295 But confused
jurors took political action less often, the theory being that they were less
confident in their abilities or views.296
Jurors who did feel that they understood the trial increased their political
action and community participation afterwards.297 And for these jurors, civil
trials were more powerful than criminal trials for “developing the political selfconfidence of less active and informed voters.”298
C. Understanding of Different Views/Empathy
The theory behind this product of jury service works in a few ways. For de
Tocqueville, it was the empathy involved in imagining oneself as a plaintiff or
defendant in a lawsuit.299 For other commentators, it is the give-and-take
among the people of different backgrounds in the jury room that leads to
tolerance and understanding of different views and empathy for others.
The political scientist Diana Mutz conducted an interesting study exploring
the relationship between exposure to people with different viewpoints and
attitudes toward others.300 There is good news and bad news. The good news is
that exposure to people with different political views can help increase
tolerance of different viewpoints.301 As indicated earlier, though, the bad news
is that being exposed to different viewpoints actually leads to less political
participation, not more.302 The reason apparently is that people fear the social

295
296
297

GASTIL ET AL., supra note 28, at 118–19.
Id. at 119.
Id. This particular group was a fairly small sample size, so the conclusions are particularly tentative.

See id.
298

Id. at 153.
See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 274. When imagining oneself a defendant in a lawsuit, one was
also learning the “manly” virtue of personal responsibility, according to de Tocqueville. See id.
300 MUTZ, supra note 288, at 63 (summarizing the nature of the survey).
301 Id. at 76–78.
302 Id. at 111–14.
299
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conflict that can arise from engaging with people who have different views.303
Doing so makes them less inclined to do so in the future.304
Even more than increasing tolerance of different views, one might think
that exposure to a diverse group of citizens might make one more tolerant
generally—it might reduce prejudice. Indeed, this is what is known as the
“intergroup contact hypothesis,” and the research seems to indicate that, in
certain circumstances, exposure to diverse views does have the desired
effect.305
Of course, the inquiry is an incremental one: To what extent are people
exposed in the civil jury to a diversity of views or backgrounds that they are
not otherwise exposed to in their everyday lives? Interestingly, though we do
not have much direct evidence, we can draw on research into social networks
to speculate that the effect may be greater for people who live in urban areas
than in rural areas.306 Is the civil jury one of those contexts where exposure to
diverse views is likely to occur? We don’t have any direct evidence on the
subject.
Despite the excellent Jury and Democracy Project and Mutz’s work, they
are just a start. Much more empirical work needs to be done—based in part on
a clearer conception of the causal mechanisms between particular aspects of
jury service and aspects of citizenship—to continue to explore these questions
about the value of the civil jury as a political institution.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Conceiving of the civil jury as a political institution is not new.307 But it is
new to, first, evaluate its performance as such and, second, seek to reform and
strengthen it as a political institution. It is second nature in the literature and
public debate to evaluate and then argue about ways to improve the way the

303 See id. at 116–23 (analyzing survey data and concluding that people who have social networks that
include those with different political views limit their political activity “to avoid putting their social
relationships at risk”).
304 Id. at 114–15.
305 Id. at 64–65 (citing GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954); and Rupert Brown &
Miles Hewstone, An Integrated Theory of Intergroup Contact, 37 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
255, 256 (2005)).
306 Id. at 11 (citing Claude S. Fischer, Community Values, Diversity, and Conflict in City Life, in
DIVERSITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 213, 216 (Neil J. Smelser & Jeffrey C. Alexander eds., 1999)).
307 See supra note 28.
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civil jury functions as an adjudicative institution—to help ensure that the jury
decides cases in a fair and accurate way.
How to improve the functioning of the civil jury as a political institution—
its ability to command legitimacy of the civil justice system among citizens, to
define and reflect community norms, to act as a check on government and
corporate power, and to increase political and civic engagement among those
who serve—has rarely been seriously evaluated or discussed. And it may well
be that in discussing these issues, scholars and policymakers conclude that one
or more of the political functions are no longer worth pursuing.
A. Understanding the Trade-Offs
We have seen different kinds of trade-offs in exploring the jury’s function
as a political institution. One is a legitimacy–legitimacy trade-off. On the one
hand, a decision by a jury tends to be perceived as more fair by citizens than a
decision from a judge. On the other hand, individuals tend to see an outcome
as more fair when it is accompanied by reasons, which it is not with a jury but
tends to be with a judge.
Another is a trade-off between having a jury that represents a range of
normative viewpoints and having jurors go home and become more engaged
democratic citizens. Unfortunately, confronting viewpoints that are different
from one’s own—thought to be a desirable attribute of the civil jury experience
from either a representative- or deliberative-democracy perspective—appears
to make jurors less politically active, not more.308
And finally, the value of letting individual juries construct and apply
community norms is in serious tension with the deliberative-democratic ideals
of public discussion, accessible reasons, and binding but provisional decisions
that are later revisited in light of experience. These trade-offs, meanwhile, are
simply some of the most salient, and these are trade-offs within the confines of
the goals of the jury as a political institution. Certainly there are many other
trade-offs between the jury’s function as a political institution and its function
as an adjudicative institution in light of inner-morality-of-law values, such as
clarity and prospectivity.

308

See MUTZ, supra note 288, at 111–14.
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B. Improving the Political Institution
Exploring how to improve this political institution would require a separate
paper just to begin, but let me briefly suggest a few possibilities. These are
very much preliminary thoughts, not firm conclusions.
No initial vote. The existing research shows that juries that take initial votes
or straw polls can be verdict-driven, as opposed to evidence-driven.309 This can
lead to a dynamic that shuts down dissenting views and prevents relevant
information from being aired. A lower quality deliberation may mean not only
a less accurate outcome but also a less legitimate outcome from the jurors’
perspectives.
Eighty-percent supermajority rule. Recall that the evidence is mixed about
what the best decision rule is—unanimous or majority—from the perspective
of the civil jury as a political institution. On the one hand, a unanimousdecision rule can lead to dissenting jurors not speaking out for fear of being
ostracized as getting in the way of consensus.310 On the other hand, a majoritydecision rule can lead to the majority ignoring dissenting views because their
support is not necessary to reaching a verdict.311 Again, more research is
needed, but it may just be that the 80% supermajority rule—in place in some
jurisdictions—gets the balance about right.
Strive for occupational and educational diversity. In a sense, the
representative- and deliberative-democracy ideals will always be in some
tension, and it is unlikely that we can simply arrive at some kind of national
consensus to choose one. On the other hand, there may be ways to manage the
tension.
One possibility is to strive for occupational and educational diversity on the
jury.312 From a legitimacy perspective, this kind of representativeness on the
jury can increase the legitimacy of the outcome for the litigants and their
lawyers.313 For example, take a premises liability, or “slip-and-fall,” case that
happened in a store. Litigants might be reassured to hear that there were efforts
309

See Hastie et al., supra note 193, at 296–99.
See, e.g., Mendelberg & Karpowitz, supra note 189, at 106.
311 See ABRAMSON, supra note 32, at 179–205 (arguing that a unanimity rule avoids the problem of
ignoring dissenters); Diamond et al., supra note 192, at 230 (concluding that observed civil jury deliberations
“demonstrate that thoughtful minorities are sometimes marginalized when the majority has the power to ignore
them in reaching a verdict”).
312 See supra notes 132, 187, and accompanying text.
313 See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
310
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made to include on the jury not only the perspective of customers but also the
perspective of people who have worked in stores. This kind of diversity would
have a benefit for deliberative democracy as well, because the evidence shows
that occupational and educational diversity is highly correlated with cognitive
diversity, which is in turn associated with better outcomes.314
Rethink the county as community. The literature on local government law
tells us that boundaries like county lines are frequently the product of past
decisions over who belongs where, decisions very much tied up with race and
class.315 In other cases, county lines may simply be arbitrary.316 Either way, if
we take seriously the idea that the civil jury is a site for constituting
community, we need to think harder about what the relevant community ought
to be.
It may be that, instead of selecting jurors randomly from a particular
county, we should try to have a representative jury from different census tracts
within the county. Alternatively, it may be that, to get a certain kind of
descriptive representation or diversity on a jury, we ought to construct the jury
pool across county lines, say, from residents who live within a ten-mile radius
of the courthouse.
Encourage jurors to keep in touch. This may appear to be a strange and not
very law-like or policy-oriented suggestion. But if we think that engaging in
democratic governance with others can increase political and civic engagement
down the road, it may well be that fostering relationships among jurors can
have an even greater effect. One can imagine the foreperson passing around a
piece of paper and asking any jurors who wouldn’t mind to share their contact
information. Jurors can simply opt out of such an arrangement if they so
choose. In a world where many people have hundreds of Facebook friends, this
might be an easy way to foster continued engagement.

314 See PAGE, supra note 185, at 302–05, 322–25 (summarizing evidence on cognitive-diversity benefits
in the problem-solving context).
315 See Briffault, supra note 232, at 1142 (citing NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS: PRIVATE VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 23–24 (1994)) (describing the formation of county
and incorporated town boundaries).
316 See Lisa R. Pruitt, Spatial Inequality as Constitutional Infirmity: Equal Protection, Child Poverty and
Place, 71 MONT. L. REV. 1, 75 (2010) (discussing “the arbitrary nature of county boundaries” in Montana). Or
county lines may be the product of geographical features. See 35 DAVID B. BROOKS, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES:
COUNTY AND SPECIAL DISTRICT LAW § 1.6 (2d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2012) (“Texas customarily defined newly
created counties in terms of waterways, established roads, the dividing ridge between river basins, and
previously established surveys.”).
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C. Concluding Thoughts
I do not claim that thinking about the role of the civil jury as a political
institution can help decide particular cases, but it can help inform what is at
stake. Recall the high-profile Supreme Court cases mentioned in the
Introduction. In Snyder v. Phelps, the jury verdict served to articulate the voice
of the community that the conduct of the Westboro Baptist Church protesters
was “outrageous,”317 much like the message sent by the jury in Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Baker through $5 million in punitive damages against Exxon.318 Is it
important for juries to articulate community norms in this way? We can now
start to think more seriously about that question.
In Wyeth v Levine, we can see the civil jury acting as a backstop to the
FDA, and as a check on corporate power, and begin to assess whether that is an
appropriate function of the civil jury to serve.319 And in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes, an employment discrimination class action, we can see the specter of
the civil jury performing both of these functions: acting as a check on
corporate power in combination with the class action device and being
prepared to articulate community norms of equal treatment for men and
women if it were to hold the company liable at trial.320 These functions, of
course, are to be weighed against the due process concerns that carried the day
in the Court.321
Having begun to think more seriously about the civil jury as a political
institution, then, we now have the resources to start to make judgments about
the importance of these political functions, both relative to each other and
relative to the concerns about the jury as an adjudicative institution that
prompted the Court to take these cases in the first place. Of course, our
primary focus ought to remain on juries (and judges) deciding cases as fairly
and accurately as possible. But we can also begin to take seriously de
Tocqueville’s admonition that it is as a political institution, that the civil jury
“must always be judged.”

317
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320
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See 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
See 554 U.S. 471, 515 (2008).
See 555 U.S. 555, 564, 604, 626 (2009).
See 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
See id. at 2559.

